0
00:00:01.705 --> 00:00:02.135
Thank you.

1
00:00:02.205 --> 00:00:04.735
It's now just after four

2
00:00:05.155 --> 00:00:09.295
and, uh, ISH five is resumed.

3
00:00:10.035 --> 00:00:12.255
Uh, we'll move on to item two D

4
00:00:21.235 --> 00:00:21.455
Now,

5
00:00:39.955 --> 00:00:43.255
do you wanna take on the first set of questions then on

6
00:00:44.195 --> 00:00:45.455
the, uh, the changes?

7
00:00:45.925 --> 00:00:50.255
Yeah, I'm just passing to Mr. Gould

8
00:00:50.355 --> 00:00:52.735
to resume on item two D,

9
00:01:03.725 --> 00:01:04.725
Right. This, this

10
00:01:04.725 --> 00:01:07.715
first question is for the applicant's

11
00:01:07.775 --> 00:01:12.515
and I OT operators, um, in terms of,

12
00:01:13.095 --> 00:01:17.115
um, I'll call them draft

13
00:01:18.235 --> 00:01:20.395
proposals that were being considered back, um,

14
00:01:21.015 --> 00:01:23.395
in September when we had the last set of hearings.

15
00:01:24.055 --> 00:01:27.635
Um, can we get some clarification please from both sides?

16
00:01:28.455 --> 00:01:31.315
Uh, I think I'll start with iot first as to

17
00:01:31.315 --> 00:01:35.595
what you thought, um, the scheme was

18
00:01:36.265 --> 00:01:39.995
that, um, in effect was subject to the letter

19
00:01:40.705 --> 00:01:44.195
that came in, um, as an midar document.

20
00:01:45.095 --> 00:01:49.755
Um, IAS um, 20, which had the, the plan appended to it.

21
00:01:50.375 --> 00:01:54.795
So in, in terms of IO ot, what did you think, um,

22
00:01:57.095 --> 00:01:59.875
was the basis of the discussions at that stage?

23
00:02:00.665 --> 00:02:03.875
Well, David Elvin for iot, uh,

24
00:02:03.955 --> 00:02:04.955
I, sorry, I should clarify. In

25
00:02:04.955 --> 00:02:07.555
terms specifically in terms of alterations

26
00:02:07.575 --> 00:02:08.635

to the finger peer,

27
00:02:09.095 --> 00:02:10.095
Yes.

28
00:02:10.225 --> 00:02:11.475
What we,

29
00:02:13.225 --> 00:02:15.955
what we thought was agreed was something, well,

30
00:02:15.955 --> 00:02:18.075
as the letter itself says as 20

31
00:02:18.605 --> 00:02:21.395
based generally on the Beckett ranking high level proposals,

32
00:02:21.955 --> 00:02:24.195
albeit with possible refinements, uh,

33
00:02:24.255 --> 00:02:26.075
as referenced at a reading recent meeting.

34
00:02:26.095 --> 00:02:28.795
And you recall you saw the, the plan of that.

35
00:02:29.655 --> 00:02:34.275
Uh, and it was then thought, as you'll see in items one

36
00:02:34.615 --> 00:02:39.195
to four in particular, we were looking at revised

37
00:02:39.735 --> 00:02:41.555
layout, uh,

38
00:02:41.735 --> 00:02:46.595
and, uh, impact protection measures, uh,

39
00:02:46.655 --> 00:02:47.675
uh, in that context.

40
00:02:49.255 --> 00:02:52.475
And that the engineering design would be subject to approval

41
00:02:52.575 --> 00:02:53.635
by IO ot.

42
00:02:55.655 --> 00:02:59.195
Uh, and if they were acceptable,

43
00:02:59.955 --> 00:03:03.805
then draft DCO would be amended in the form substantially

44
00:03:03.835 --> 00:03:06.845
submitted by us REP 1 0 3 9.

45
00:03:07.585 --> 00:03:10.005
The position we have reached is that

46
00:03:10.005 --> 00:03:11.365
that is no longer feasible.

47
00:03:12.735 --> 00:03:14.285
Wanna go back one step? Yeah.

48
00:03:14.345 --> 00:03:16.725
In terms of the physical works, uh, yeah.

49
00:03:17.425 --> 00:03:19.885
Uh, to, to the finger pair in terms of an extension,

50
00:03:20.585 --> 00:03:22.565
was it IOT's understanding that

51
00:03:22.565 --> 00:03:25.725
that might mean work an extension of up to a hundred meters?

52
00:03:25.765 --> 00:03:27.805
I think that's the number that's been quoted.

53
00:03:32.225 --> 00:03:32.885

Let me, let me,

54
00:03:39.115 --> 00:03:42.245
Because that's, that seems to be a number that, um,

55
00:03:42.845 --> 00:03:46.245
IO OT in when you made your deadline five submission

56
00:03:47.485 --> 00:03:48.525
referred to Yes.

57
00:03:48.585 --> 00:03:51.645
In amongst, uh, I think it was a covering letter, um,

58
00:03:52.115 --> 00:03:54.645
that I'm not sure at that stage it'd had gone

59
00:03:54.645 --> 00:03:56.565
to the applicant, but it certainly came in as part

60
00:03:56.585 --> 00:03:58.965
of the examination submission at that point.

61
00:03:59.025 --> 00:04:01.965
It, it talked about, I think it was a hundred meters.

62
00:04:02.105 --> 00:04:06.565
It talked about the need for, um, pipe work changes.

63
00:04:07.025 --> 00:04:10.845
It talked about the need for, um, rearrangement

64
00:04:10.845 --> 00:04:12.285
of arms, loading arms.

65
00:04:12.865 --> 00:04:17.485
Yes. So was all of that as far as iot is concerned

66
00:04:18.145 --> 00:04:21.205
in the melting pot at the point the discussion took place

67
00:04:21.205 --> 00:04:23.165
before the letter was finalized?

68
00:04:27.995 --> 00:04:31.005
Well, I, I, I, I think the answer is we, we,

69
00:04:31.105 --> 00:04:33.205
we were not a hundred percent sure of the final design,

70
00:04:33.345 --> 00:04:35.605
but the 0.1, the revised layout

71
00:04:35.785 --> 00:04:37.845
for the finger pair obviously means

72
00:04:38.035 --> 00:04:39.885
that if you revise the layout, you have

73
00:04:39.885 --> 00:04:42.005
to revise the infrastructure that goes with the layout.

74
00:04:42.745 --> 00:04:45.365
So I think it's, it was clearly implicit in

75
00:04:45.365 --> 00:04:48.285
that though the precise details were not simply

76
00:04:48.285 --> 00:04:51.885
because, um, they were matters for discussion.

77
00:04:57.065 --> 00:04:58.245
But you can't revise the layout

78
00:04:58.345 --> 00:05:00.165
to the finger pair without revising the

79
00:05:00.165 --> 00:05:01.405
infrastructure that goes with it.

80
00:05:03.185 --> 00:05:05.005

No, but I just wanna be clear

81
00:05:05.005 --> 00:05:08.525
because there's, there's criticism that infect, um,

82
00:05:08.745 --> 00:05:10.725
the applicant has, has said, oh, not,

83
00:05:10.785 --> 00:05:12.005
not prepared to do that.

84
00:05:12.545 --> 00:05:14.245
Uh, I, the package it works,

85
00:05:15.195 --> 00:05:17.765
that the a hundred meter extension, was that something

86
00:05:17.955 --> 00:05:20.365
that would've come up in the discussions

87
00:05:20.365 --> 00:05:21.965
that the applicant would've been aware of

88
00:05:21.995 --> 00:05:24.645
that potentially quite a significant extensions,

89
00:05:24.645 --> 00:05:26.605
the finger pair would be required?

90
00:05:28.315 --> 00:05:29.925
I'll need to double check with those

91
00:05:29.925 --> 00:05:31.125
who had the discussions first.

92
00:05:31.625 --> 00:05:31.845
Yes.

93
00:05:52.865 --> 00:05:54.005
The short answer is yes.

94
00:06:04.815 --> 00:06:07.245
Thank you. Mr. Vin then turning to the applicant,

95
00:06:07.275 --> 00:06:09.125
what was the applicant's understanding of

96
00:06:09.125 --> 00:06:11.845
what formed the basis of those discussions that led

97
00:06:11.845 --> 00:06:13.525
to the letter of 28th of September?

98
00:06:17.495 --> 00:06:20.335
I will, sorry, James won for the applicant, sir,

99
00:06:20.495 --> 00:06:21.975
I will pass down.

100
00:06:21.995 --> 00:06:26.695
But the, the, our, our understanding is that that length

101
00:06:26.715 --> 00:06:30.415
of extension was not, uh, known as to

102
00:06:30.435 --> 00:06:31.735
as being requirement.

103
00:06:32.975 --> 00:06:33.975
I, I assume so.

104
00:06:34.055 --> 00:06:37.855
You probably would've seen our response,

105
00:06:37.995 --> 00:06:42.295
or sorry, the explanation of what we understood in relation

106
00:06:42.295 --> 00:06:44.455
to the change notification

107
00:06:48.195 --> 00:06:50.975

letter, um, summarized it.

108
00:06:55.045 --> 00:06:56.255
I've lost the reference now.

109
00:07:00.365 --> 00:07:02.215
Chapter four.

110
00:07:03.145 --> 00:07:06.855
Sorry, I I thought I was gonna be health

111
00:07:06.855 --> 00:07:08.415
and give you a document reference.

112
00:07:08.475 --> 00:07:12.215
Now it's not written on my, I'll find you a reference,

113
00:07:12.275 --> 00:07:16.175
but the, in the CHA proposed chosen NA changes

114
00:07:16.335 --> 00:07:17.655
notification report,

115
00:07:19.455 --> 00:07:20.815
A 0 2 7.

116
00:07:20.905 --> 00:07:23.415
Thank you very much. Um, oh, it is,

117
00:07:23.495 --> 00:07:24.855
I know I see it at the top of my pen.

118
00:07:27.505 --> 00:07:32.255
There, there is an explanation in that as to our,

119
00:07:32.355 --> 00:07:33.815
our understanding at the time

120
00:07:33.875 --> 00:07:36.855
of the 28th of September letter.

121
00:07:40.035 --> 00:07:42.575
But happy for that to be confirmed down the table

122
00:07:47.875 --> 00:07:50.135
As it seems to be quite a bone of contention.

123
00:07:50.215 --> 00:07:52.295
I think it would be useful to have it confirmed

124
00:07:52.355 --> 00:07:56.055
by whoever was present in the discussions with IO ot.

125
00:08:07.835 --> 00:08:10.975
Uh, and while that's being organized, can, can we ask for

126
00:08:11.035 --> 00:08:13.495
as 0 27 to be put up on screen please?

127
00:09:03.965 --> 00:09:05.225
Uh, Yes, we are waiting.

128
00:09:16.375 --> 00:09:20.465
Good afternoon. Uh, Ben Hodgkin for ABP, um, I wasn't party

129
00:09:20.565 --> 00:09:24.425
to the discussions, but on the basis of the, um, sketch

130
00:09:24.425 --> 00:09:25.665
that was appended to the letter,

131
00:09:26.405 --> 00:09:28.345
the overall extension is in the order of,

132
00:09:28.605 --> 00:09:31.865
and it acknowledge high level sketch,

133
00:09:32.975 --> 00:09:33.985
there's no dimensions,

134
00:09:33.985 --> 00:09:36.065

but in the order of 40 meter extension,

135
00:09:36.065 --> 00:09:37.065
it's shown on the sketch.

136
00:09:38.045 --> 00:09:42.265
And I can describe in more detail the discussions

137
00:09:42.265 --> 00:09:44.185
that we subsequently had with IOT

138
00:09:44.185 --> 00:09:46.585
and their design consultants.

139
00:09:46.925 --> 00:09:49.745
But following the conclusion of those discussions,

140
00:09:49.745 --> 00:09:53.225
it was clear that an overall length extension

141
00:09:53.225 --> 00:09:54.585
of a hundred meters was required.

142
00:09:55.325 --> 00:09:57.705
So a 25% increase on what's shown

143
00:09:57.705 --> 00:09:58.745
on the Beckett Rankin Sketch

144
00:10:32.635 --> 00:10:33.845
Prejudice, yes.

145
00:10:40.625 --> 00:10:41.905
Shelving for the, i

146
00:10:42.295 --> 00:10:44.945
There's a slight complication, which,

147
00:10:44.945 --> 00:10:47.945
which is there are without prejudice emails going backwards

148
00:10:48.065 --> 00:10:51.945
and forwards leading up to the letter and all,

149
00:10:52.365 --> 00:10:55.305
and ABP may be willing to release those

150
00:10:55.305 --> 00:10:57.345
because they will show you what we were discussing.

151
00:10:57.445 --> 00:11:01.025
But my instructions are, without going into the details, is

152
00:11:01.025 --> 00:11:03.385
that they were looking at something of the order

153
00:11:03.385 --> 00:11:05.825
of a hundred, possibly more, possibly slightly less,

154
00:11:06.925 --> 00:11:08.105
but roundabout a hundred

155
00:11:13.045 --> 00:11:16.345
If, if I understand correctly, as far as iot concerned,

156
00:11:16.515 --> 00:11:18.545
we've, we've got people in the room

157
00:11:18.655 --> 00:11:20.265
that were in the discussions Yes.

158
00:11:20.265 --> 00:11:22.785
Yeah. For the applicant.

159
00:11:22.785 --> 00:11:24.665
Have we have, we actually got somebody

160
00:11:24.665 --> 00:11:25.865
that was in the discussions.

161
00:11:30.585 --> 00:11:35.325

So Paul Bristow for ABP, just to clarify that as,

162
00:11:35.385 --> 00:11:39.645
um, the, uh, APT King's Council just referred,

163
00:11:39.835 --> 00:11:43.085
there's a number of conversations running without prejudice,

164
00:11:43.745 --> 00:11:47.125
and then there's a Beckett ranking scheme that was, uh,

165
00:11:47.125 --> 00:11:50.285
sorry, schematic that was introduced separately in order

166
00:11:50.285 --> 00:11:51.285
to be able to, uh,

167
00:11:51.465 --> 00:11:54.285
and I would absolutely avoid misleading you in order

168
00:11:54.285 --> 00:11:56.885
to give you a very accurate picture of where that

169
00:11:57.475 --> 00:12:01.165
came within the 28th of February timeline that, that,

170
00:12:01.165 --> 00:12:02.525
that your question refers to.

171
00:12:02.925 --> 00:12:06.365
I would need to go back, refer to the without prejudice, uh,

172
00:12:06.365 --> 00:12:09.205
emails, look at the Beckett ranking scheme,

173
00:12:09.345 --> 00:12:10.805
and then I would be in a position

174
00:12:10.805 --> 00:12:14.125
to give you a very accurate timeline of where we got to.

175
00:12:14.465 --> 00:12:17.085
But without that, I would be real potential

176
00:12:17.085 --> 00:12:18.565
to mislead and I wouldn't want to do that.

177
00:12:19.105 --> 00:12:20.885
And that's fair. Is that something

178
00:12:20.885 --> 00:12:23.765
that could be done overnight given that we are going,

179
00:12:23.795 --> 00:12:26.045
this is a two day hearing, um,

180
00:12:26.545 --> 00:12:29.925
and no doubt if not everybody that's present here today,

181
00:12:30.145 --> 00:12:31.165
at least a goodly number,

182
00:12:31.185 --> 00:12:32.365
are gonna be present here tomorrow.

183
00:12:33.025 --> 00:12:35.045
Um, is that something that could be checked overnight

184
00:12:35.045 --> 00:12:37.045
and we, we will come back to it?

185
00:12:38.065 --> 00:12:40.885
Uh, if not, then I think it'll have to be done

186
00:12:41.025 --> 00:12:42.725
as a written submission post-hearing.

187
00:12:43.505 --> 00:12:45.925
But the examining authority would like some clarity

188
00:12:45.995 --> 00:12:50.565

because it does look like, uh, quite radical change

189
00:12:50.785 --> 00:12:52.045
or understandings of

190
00:12:52.045 --> 00:12:54.525
what was being discussed appears to have arisen.

191
00:12:55.345 --> 00:12:58.285
Um, and we definitely some clarity on, on that.

192
00:12:59.105 --> 00:13:02.685
So when, when, when ab p doing its due diligence on, on

193
00:13:02.685 --> 00:13:04.645
that, um, can I just say

194
00:13:04.645 --> 00:13:07.885
that the Harbor master also I think contributed a view

195
00:13:07.885 --> 00:13:10.485
that it might be able to be slightly shorter than that,

196
00:13:11.065 --> 00:13:13.565
but we're still looking in the same order of magnitude.

197
00:13:15.185 --> 00:13:18.405
And just on a point of taking measurements off drawings,

198
00:13:18.505 --> 00:13:21.245
are we all comfortable that the drawings that we are using,

199
00:13:22.065 --> 00:13:23.965
uh, are firstly the right drawing,

200
00:13:24.145 --> 00:13:27.965
but also that the, uh, scale, um,

201
00:13:28.625 --> 00:13:30.285
is being correctly interpreted?

202
00:13:30.285 --> 00:13:32.725
We haven't got issues where, um,

203
00:13:32.725 --> 00:13:34.525
sometimes when you use electronic drawings,

204
00:13:34.545 --> 00:13:36.085
if you don't correct for scale,

205
00:13:36.265 --> 00:13:37.925
you'll get a duff measurement.

206
00:13:38.825 --> 00:13:43.445
Um, I have lots of issues with, uh, us having to work

207
00:13:43.445 --> 00:13:44.645
with electronic drawings,

208
00:13:44.645 --> 00:13:48.085
and it becomes quite difficult sometimes when dimensions are

209
00:13:48.085 --> 00:13:51.605
important to get the correct dimensions without fiddling

210
00:13:51.605 --> 00:13:54.445
around with a percentage enlargement on screen

211
00:13:54.465 --> 00:13:56.525
to get the right measurement.

212
00:13:57.065 --> 00:14:00.005
So, uh, David Elwin again, can I, can I make a statement

213
00:14:00.065 --> 00:14:01.885
of, of the obvious it,

214
00:14:01.985 --> 00:14:05.285
the drawing says indicative layout not to scale,

215
00:14:06.225 --> 00:14:11.045

and the terms of the letter said, generally this was produ,

216
00:14:11.045 --> 00:14:14.045
this plan was produced very quickly in order

217
00:14:14.065 --> 00:14:16.125
to illustrate the general nature of

218
00:14:16.125 --> 00:14:17.125
what was being discussed.

219
00:14:17.145 --> 00:14:18.145
It was not to scale.

220
00:14:20.585 --> 00:14:23.435
Well, at least, at least that puts to bed any possibility

221
00:14:23.435 --> 00:14:24.435
that there's an issue with the

222
00:14:24.435 --> 00:14:25.435
wrong scale going on the drawing.

223
00:14:25.435 --> 00:14:25.835
Anyway,

224
00:14:36.175 --> 00:14:36.395
Mr.

225
00:14:36.585 --> 00:14:39.555
Brie is, are you going to be able to review, um,

226
00:14:40.225 --> 00:14:41.915
that documentation overnight?

227
00:14:42.025 --> 00:14:44.875
Because I think we, we had three or four questions,

228
00:14:44.875 --> 00:14:47.235
but I think we need to get this first one right.

229
00:14:47.295 --> 00:14:49.555
So it might be better to allow that review

230
00:14:49.555 --> 00:14:51.405
to take place overnight if it's possible,

231
00:14:51.985 --> 00:14:53.925
and we'll come back to this tomorrow.

232
00:14:54.865 --> 00:14:55.965
Uh, and we can move on

233
00:14:55.965 --> 00:15:00.485
to another topic area rather than wasting too much time, um,

234
00:15:01.335 --> 00:15:03.885
where there may be a bit of confusion about, um,

235
00:15:05.685 --> 00:15:07.885
checking documentation.

236
00:15:08.785 --> 00:15:10.085
But Ms. pe, is

237
00:15:10.085 --> 00:15:11.405
that something you would be able to do overnight?

238
00:15:12.105 --> 00:15:14.365
So Paul Bristow for ABP? Absolutely.

239
00:15:14.425 --> 00:15:16.685
We can, uh, achieve that overnight and, uh,

240
00:15:16.705 --> 00:15:18.045
and present that at, at,

241
00:15:18.065 --> 00:15:19.725
at your convenience first thing in the morning.

242
00:15:27.215 --> 00:15:29.035

Our iot happy to proceed on that.

243
00:15:29.035 --> 00:15:32.715
We had a few questions about the change side of things, um,

244
00:15:32.735 --> 00:15:35.835
but I think it's gonna make sense if we defer that

245
00:15:35.885 --> 00:15:38.475
until tomorrow we're here.

246
00:15:38.915 --> 00:15:42.675
Yeah. Okay. I think that's how we proceed then.

247
00:15:42.675 --> 00:15:43.915
So I'm gonna hand back to Mr. Bradley.

248
00:15:45.415 --> 00:15:49.195
Um, just a quick clarifier, um, to the io, um, to

249
00:15:49.865 --> 00:15:52.595
both the iot team and the DFTS team.

250
00:15:53.695 --> 00:15:57.875
Are you happy that we can, if, in a sense, take these,

251
00:15:58.585 --> 00:16:00.315
this line of questioning outta sequence,

252
00:16:01.675 --> 00:16:03.275
Isabella to four DFDS?

253
00:16:03.275 --> 00:16:05.115
Can I just be clear, sir, on, on your pre,

254
00:16:05.115 --> 00:16:07.515
are you moving away altogether from agenda item two D?

255
00:16:08.615 --> 00:16:12.195
Uh, basically I think what we'll have to do,

256
00:16:12.655 --> 00:16:15.875
I'm just scanning forward to see, uh,

257
00:16:17.145 --> 00:16:21.875
whether we can reasonably do anything on two D without

258
00:16:21.905 --> 00:16:23.275
that base information.

259
00:16:24.275 --> 00:16:27.035
I think there is, but essentially, uh,

260
00:16:28.135 --> 00:16:30.875
it will mean parking the matter

261
00:16:30.875 --> 00:16:32.875
of configuration until tomorrow.

262
00:16:34.315 --> 00:16:39.235
Isabella, for DFDS, for my part, sir, I'm happy to deal

263
00:16:39.235 --> 00:16:41.995
with the matters, however you best see fit,

264
00:16:41.995 --> 00:16:43.275
however it would most assist you.

265
00:16:46.565 --> 00:16:48.035
Let's just give a heads up then.

266
00:16:48.665 --> 00:16:51.595
What I would like to do in

267
00:16:54.455 --> 00:16:59.235
The session tomorrow is for the applicant to respond in turn

268
00:16:59.295 --> 00:17:02.995
to the issues raised by IOT in its, uh, letters

269
00:17:03.055 --> 00:17:05.275

of the 7th of November, the 13th of November,

270
00:17:05.375 --> 00:17:06.635
and the 16th of November.

271
00:17:07.375 --> 00:17:10.755
Um, those are all appended to rep 6 0 4 6,

272
00:17:11.775 --> 00:17:14.715
and, um, of which my sense is

273
00:17:14.715 --> 00:17:17.915
that the 13th of November letter is the one to, to start

274
00:17:17.915 --> 00:17:20.715
with, is the one which is most, uh, salient.

275
00:17:21.295 --> 00:17:26.075
Um, and that, uh, the, the, the first point is, uh,

276
00:17:27.515 --> 00:17:30.555
a, um, a criticism on change one.

277
00:17:32.415 --> 00:17:36.635
Uh, and, uh, I'd then like, uh, a response in regard

278
00:17:36.635 --> 00:17:39.555
to their, uh, comments on change four,

279
00:17:39.765 --> 00:17:42.315
which is the matter in really in hand

280
00:17:43.255 --> 00:17:44.355
for the overnight study.

281
00:17:45.295 --> 00:17:46.995
Um, and

282
00:17:52.425 --> 00:17:55.285
in particular the points that iot have made

283
00:17:55.285 --> 00:17:57.205
regarding modifications to pipe work

284
00:17:57.205 --> 00:18:01.045
and marine loading arms, um, impact protection measures

285
00:18:01.045 --> 00:18:02.725
with either closed or open structure

286
00:18:05.545 --> 00:18:09.525
and whether with or without fendering impact speed.

287
00:18:11.105 --> 00:18:15.165
Um, and more generally, there's a point

288
00:18:15.165 --> 00:18:18.045
that's been made in the representations about the

289
00:18:18.795 --> 00:18:21.525
urgency being applied here in the spirit of co cooperation.

290
00:18:22.185 --> 00:18:24.125
Uh, so that's the heads up of

291
00:18:24.215 --> 00:18:25.725
where we'd like you to go tomorrow.

292
00:18:26.865 --> 00:18:31.845
Um, I would like

293
00:18:31.845 --> 00:18:36.685
to just out of, out of, um, the other planned questions,

294
00:18:37.385 --> 00:18:42.165
uh, like to Ask the question,

295
00:18:42.545 --> 00:18:42.765
um,

296
00:18:48.115 --> 00:18:51.575

to iot first and then have the applicant respond,

297
00:18:52.035 --> 00:18:56.255
and that is the risk of construction vessel,

298
00:18:57.075 --> 00:19:00.695
um, a lesion, uh, as a consequence of loss of power,

299
00:19:03.475 --> 00:19:06.735
has that been adequately assessed in your, in IOT's opinion?

300
00:19:10.435 --> 00:19:14.095
And by the way, I'm aware that you've spent a lot

301
00:19:14.095 --> 00:19:16.375
of attention looking at the consequences of loss

302
00:19:16.375 --> 00:19:17.695
of power for a row row vessel.

303
00:19:18.635 --> 00:19:22.175
I'm now asking the question regard to construction vessels.

304
00:19:25.215 --> 00:19:26.855
Ed Rogers for iot.

305
00:19:27.395 --> 00:19:30.695
Um, you'll note from the IOT, uh,

306
00:19:30.695 --> 00:19:32.495
shadow navigation risk assessment, that

307
00:19:32.495 --> 00:19:36.055
that focused purely on the operational phase of the, uh,

308
00:19:36.215 --> 00:19:38.415
I development, uh, taking a view

309
00:19:38.415 --> 00:19:40.535
that in the limited time available, that was the priority

310
00:19:40.715 --> 00:19:42.775
for us to, uh, look at and assess.

311
00:19:43.395 --> 00:19:45.735
As such, we haven't done the detailed work necessary

312
00:19:45.755 --> 00:19:50.095
to understand what the, uh, uh, impact would be

313
00:19:50.355 --> 00:19:52.135
for construction vessels as of yet,

314
00:19:54.475 --> 00:19:55.735
Uh, accepted.

315
00:19:56.155 --> 00:20:01.055
Um, have you seen anything in the applicant's work, um,

316
00:20:01.385 --> 00:20:05.615
which gives any, uh, indication of, of potential impact, uh,

317
00:20:06.125 --> 00:20:09.255
from construction vessel, uh, loss of power

318
00:20:13.055 --> 00:20:14.175
Ed Rogers for iot?

319
00:20:14.555 --> 00:20:18.455
Um, we would expect

320
00:20:18.645 --> 00:20:21.415
that a similar level of assessment be undertaken as

321
00:20:21.615 --> 00:20:24.255
provided by the IOTS, uh,

322
00:20:24.715 --> 00:20:27.975
shadow navigation risk assessment in relation to that,

323
00:20:27.975 --> 00:20:30.335

looking at the cost benefit of any form

324
00:20:30.335 --> 00:20:32.175
of impact protection measures that may be necessary

325
00:20:32.175 --> 00:20:33.255
for the construction phase.

326
00:20:33.835 --> 00:20:36.495
As, as we understand it, the, um,

327
00:20:37.445 --> 00:20:39.295
control measures being proposed are those

328
00:20:39.295 --> 00:20:41.935
that would be normally embedded in any form of construction

329
00:20:42.435 --> 00:20:45.895
and, uh, are no more significant than would be,

330
00:20:45.895 --> 00:20:47.325
would be expected with

331
00:20:47.325 --> 00:20:49.525
or without the iot trunk lane in position.

332
00:20:50.865 --> 00:20:51.285
Mm-Hmm.

333
00:20:55.945 --> 00:20:59.805
And this is a matter for your expert opinion.

334
00:21:00.305 --> 00:21:04.965
Um, the consequences of, uh, a, uh, uh,

335
00:21:05.525 --> 00:21:06.765
construction vessel loss of power

336
00:21:09.905 --> 00:21:13.485
are the most likely consequences comparable to that of, um,

337
00:21:14.045 --> 00:21:16.885
a row, row vessel loss of power?

338
00:21:17.585 --> 00:21:20.365
Or are we talking about a different order of magnitude?

339
00:21:24.405 --> 00:21:25.965
Ed Rogers for iot?

340
00:21:26.485 --> 00:21:29.165
I think that's a very difficult question to ask in relation

341
00:21:29.305 --> 00:21:32.125
to whether there is existing infrastructure such

342
00:21:32.125 --> 00:21:33.325
as the iot in place

343
00:21:33.905 --> 00:21:35.845
and at what stage of construction, uh,

344
00:21:36.285 --> 00:21:37.605
a possible a lesion maker.

345
00:21:37.795 --> 00:21:41.685
Yeah. Um, in essence, most construction vessels are probably

346
00:21:42.225 --> 00:21:45.525
of a, uh, smaller displacement, uh,

347
00:21:45.555 --> 00:21:48.325
than the proposed iat uh, design vessels,

348
00:21:48.665 --> 00:21:51.045
but obviously at various stages of the construction,

349
00:21:51.045 --> 00:21:53.485
there'll be nothing, no infrastructure that,

350
00:21:53.485 --> 00:21:56.085

that could afford any, uh, impact protection at all.

351
00:21:58.705 --> 00:22:03.285
So I think that's an opportunity now to, for the applicant

352
00:22:03.285 --> 00:22:07.205
to respond on this question of the assessment of risk

353
00:22:07.205 --> 00:22:09.005
during the construction phase as opposed

354
00:22:09.025 --> 00:22:10.405
to the operational phase.

355
00:22:10.865 --> 00:22:15.725
And I think we have to be particularly, uh, conscious of

356
00:22:15.725 --> 00:22:20.405
that difficult overlap phase of construction, uh,

357
00:22:21.235 --> 00:22:22.525
dash operation.

358
00:22:23.625 --> 00:22:28.525
Now, what would the applicant's team's view be

359
00:22:28.865 --> 00:22:33.645
of, um, uh, most likely consequences of a, um,

360
00:22:34.005 --> 00:22:37.605
a loss of power with regard to a construction vessel?

361
00:22:44.945 --> 00:22:46.445
Uh, James Hannan, now ABP?

362
00:22:46.705 --> 00:22:49.805
Um, yeah, so this has been, um, considered with, um,

363
00:22:50.245 --> 00:22:52.765
construction vessels impact on IT infrastructure within the,

364
00:22:52.785 --> 00:22:54.005
the, the risk tables.

365
00:22:54.825 --> 00:22:59.005
And, uh, it, it's, um, it has been, um, assessed as,

366
00:22:59.065 --> 00:23:00.165
as, as acceptable.

367
00:23:00.865 --> 00:23:03.445
Um, obviously the, the, the nature of the,

368
00:23:03.445 --> 00:23:05.885
of the vessel is very different from a, from a row, row

369
00:23:05.885 --> 00:23:10.285
or are, uh, are, are of a, a lighter construction.

370
00:23:11.065 --> 00:23:13.845
Um, so the consequences even in, in the most, uh,

371
00:23:13.845 --> 00:23:18.245
in the worst likely scenario are, are still, um, possible.

372
00:23:18.505 --> 00:23:21.685
But, um, the, the consequences are, are, are not as severe

373
00:23:21.865 --> 00:23:23.845
as they would be the likes of a railroad vessel.

374
00:23:25.465 --> 00:23:27.965
Is that because of the, uh, uh, uh, of, of,

375
00:23:28.095 --> 00:23:29.685
let's call it the inertia of the vessel?

376
00:23:30.865 --> 00:23:33.405
It would be the, the, uh, the, the, the I should the,

377
00:23:33.405 --> 00:23:35.365

the weight and the, the, the force of the vessel.

378
00:23:35.465 --> 00:23:37.605
So it would be the energy that the vessel would actually,

379
00:23:37.745 --> 00:23:40.925
um, uh, uh, transfer onto, onto the,

380
00:23:40.925 --> 00:23:42.205
onto the, uh, infrastructure,

381
00:23:47.075 --> 00:23:48.885
Just for our understanding.

382
00:23:49.265 --> 00:23:54.125
Um, what's the, uh,

383
00:23:56.185 --> 00:24:00.365
in inner word, the, um, the, the likelihood of loss

384
00:24:00.365 --> 00:24:01.765
of power of a construction vessel?

385
00:24:10.105 --> 00:24:12.045
So looking at the, uh, the, the tables

386
00:24:12.045 --> 00:24:15.245
that we've produced, um, we have got it down that it, it is,

387
00:24:15.345 --> 00:24:19.045
it is possible, but the, let's say the, the, the outcome is,

388
00:24:19.105 --> 00:24:22.725
is, um, is, is, uh, relatively, um, uh,

389
00:24:23.665 --> 00:24:26.725
Uh, In, not insignificant, but it's relatively minor.

390
00:24:29.635 --> 00:24:29.925
Okay.

391
00:24:39.665 --> 00:24:44.005
Before passing on to, um, a matter

392
00:24:44.005 --> 00:24:48.445
of anchor drop as a risk control for row row vessels, um,

393
00:24:49.545 --> 00:24:52.325
is anchor drop for a construction vessel

394
00:24:53.845 --> 00:24:55.805
a viable risk control,

395
00:24:58.055 --> 00:24:59.395
Uh, James hand for ABP?

396
00:24:59.395 --> 00:25:00.755
Uh, yes it is.

397
00:25:00.895 --> 00:25:03.875
Um, and also if dependent on the type of craft it is such a,

398
00:25:03.935 --> 00:25:07.195
as a, a spoke legged barge, then the, the,

399
00:25:07.195 --> 00:25:09.755
there is the ability to actually put the legs down

400
00:25:09.755 --> 00:25:11.675
to stop the vessel from drifting any further.

401
00:25:13.465 --> 00:25:17.995
Okay. Before going on,

402
00:25:18.295 --> 00:25:19.835
is there anything from DFDS

403
00:25:24.035 --> 00:25:25.915
Isabella offer for DFDS? Nothing to

404
00:25:25.915 --> 00:25:26.915

Add on that. Thanks, sir.

405
00:25:26.915 --> 00:25:28.555
Anything from I iot,

406
00:25:31.235 --> 00:25:32.515
Ed Rogers for iot?

407
00:25:33.485 --> 00:25:36.835
Sorry, I just said no, ed, but

408
00:25:36.895 --> 00:25:37.895
Go.

409
00:25:41.395 --> 00:25:44.435
I, I think the point that it is worth adding is that the,

410
00:25:44.455 --> 00:25:47.235
uh, pipe work on the TruQua is, uh,

411
00:25:47.385 --> 00:25:48.875
located on the up river side.

412
00:25:49.335 --> 00:25:52.395
Um, there is no protection to that from any,

413
00:25:52.495 --> 00:25:53.555
any vessel lesion with it.

414
00:25:54.095 --> 00:25:58.355
Um, so despite the vessels being smaller, perhaps

415
00:25:58.355 --> 00:26:00.755
during the construction phase, if they were to align

416
00:26:00.755 --> 00:26:01.795
with the trunk way, it,

417
00:26:01.795 --> 00:26:03.675
it would result in catastrophic outcome.

418
00:26:18.625 --> 00:26:21.455
Thank you. Ben Hodgkin for ABP, just a just a point

419
00:26:21.455 --> 00:26:23.375
of clarification if it's helpful

420
00:26:23.475 --> 00:26:25.375
and necessary is that the vast majority

421
00:26:25.395 --> 00:26:27.455
of construction vessels that will be in the area

422
00:26:28.085 --> 00:26:30.695
will be typically barges jack up barges,

423
00:26:31.065 --> 00:26:32.615
which will not be self propelled.

424
00:26:32.615 --> 00:26:34.215
They'll be stationary doing their work,

425
00:26:34.315 --> 00:26:36.975
and when they move between positions, they'll be assisted

426
00:26:37.035 --> 00:26:38.295
by either tug

427
00:26:38.295 --> 00:26:39.695
or a multi craft vessel

428
00:26:40.195 --> 00:26:42.295
to assist in a very discrete movement,

429
00:26:42.295 --> 00:26:44.405
which can be timed appropriately, et cetera.

430
00:26:44.425 --> 00:26:47.325
And that's all covered during normal, um,

431
00:26:47.765 --> 00:26:49.885

construction operational management procedures.

432
00:26:50.465 --> 00:26:53.525
Um, and if something were to happen, the, the sort

433
00:26:53.525 --> 00:26:56.845
of the equivalent for that sort of craft vessel is not

434
00:26:56.845 --> 00:27:00.605
to drop anchor, but to drop spud leg, which stop the vest,

435
00:27:00.705 --> 00:27:01.965
the, the craft immediately.

436
00:27:04.255 --> 00:27:06.645
Thank you. That's a very helpful in intervention.

437
00:27:07.625 --> 00:27:12.165
Moving on then, uh, there has been criticism from the IP

438
00:27:12.505 --> 00:27:17.245
of, um, use of anchor drop, um, in particular,

439
00:27:17.545 --> 00:27:22.445
um, I'm gonna ask DFS to elaborate on the comment

440
00:27:22.475 --> 00:27:27.045
that was made on the simulation carried out on anchor drop.

441
00:27:28.065 --> 00:27:31.525
Uh, I don't know that I can quote which set

442
00:27:31.525 --> 00:27:33.125
of simulations were, but I think it was in the

443
00:27:33.285 --> 00:27:35.925
November, 2022 simulations.

444
00:27:37.555 --> 00:27:39.165
Just give you a moment on that,

445
00:27:39.305 --> 00:27:40.845
but if you could comment on that

446
00:27:41.025 --> 00:27:45.565
and whether it's realistic to rely on a harbor direction

447
00:27:45.905 --> 00:27:50.325
or a bylaw indeed to require

448
00:27:50.915 --> 00:27:52.805
vessels to have ship's crew ready to drop.

449
00:27:53.065 --> 00:27:56.925
Um, uh, uh, anchor at, uh, I think in that simulation,

450
00:27:56.925 --> 00:27:59.325
it was a 22nd, uh, anchor drop.

451
00:28:00.225 --> 00:28:04.645
And whether in fact it is reasonable to expect, uh,

452
00:28:05.355 --> 00:28:08.765
that risk control to be able to arrest a vessel out

453
00:28:08.765 --> 00:28:11.445
of power, uh, within a hundred meters.

454
00:28:12.945 --> 00:28:15.125
Um, and Stafford, would you like Captain Nielsen

455
00:28:15.125 --> 00:28:16.245
to Nelson to respond?

456
00:28:20.745 --> 00:28:24.085
Yes. On behalf of, uh, DFDS, uh, thank you, sir.

457
00:28:24.785 --> 00:28:28.685
Uh, it is true that there was tested, uh, an anchor drop in,

458
00:28:28.685 --> 00:28:31.565

uh, in the simulations in, uh, November, uh, 2022.

459
00:28:33.085 --> 00:28:36.365
I will start by saying when we, uh, go into manure,

460
00:28:36.365 --> 00:28:39.605
we always have people, uh, on the manuring stations,

461
00:28:40.185 --> 00:28:42.125
but they are also preparing for the manure.

462
00:28:42.945 --> 00:28:47.405
And whether it's doable to do within 20 or 30 or 35

463
00:28:47.585 --> 00:28:49.725
or 40 seconds, that's very, very difficult to,

464
00:28:49.865 --> 00:28:50.965
uh, for me to judge.

465
00:28:51.885 --> 00:28:55.485
I would say when you do it in a simulation, then it's

466
00:28:55.485 --> 00:28:56.725
of course one thing is

467
00:28:56.725 --> 00:28:58.765
that the command should come from the bridge.

468
00:29:00.105 --> 00:29:01.485
Now you, you, you lose power

469
00:29:01.505 --> 00:29:02.805
and then you should do the command.

470
00:29:03.465 --> 00:29:06.245
And it's of course, very difficult to test this, uh,

471
00:29:06.265 --> 00:29:09.525
in a simulation where everybody knows that this is coming

472
00:29:10.805 --> 00:29:12.445
a in compared to in real life,

473
00:29:12.445 --> 00:29:13.965
where suddenly you use as power.

474
00:29:14.625 --> 00:29:18.565
And even though that the b similar

475
00:29:18.625 --> 00:29:21.245
to other operators have very pro professional mariners

476
00:29:21.435 --> 00:29:23.645
that within 20 seconds to have the anchor drop.

477
00:29:23.645 --> 00:29:25.925
That, that is in my view, uh, short time.

478
00:29:26.505 --> 00:29:29.365
But I, but I reckon it's, uh, it's difficult to, to simulate

479
00:29:29.365 --> 00:29:31.845
and maybe a better view would be to sail

480
00:29:31.905 --> 00:29:33.925
and then just cut the power at some stage.

481
00:29:33.985 --> 00:29:36.765
But still, when you are aware that something will happen,

482
00:29:36.785 --> 00:29:38.965
it is of course a different mindset than when you're

483
00:29:39.165 --> 00:29:42.005
actually out in it and suddenly all power goes off.

484
00:29:44.075 --> 00:29:46.245
That said, when the anger is dropped, then

485
00:29:46.245 --> 00:29:47.365

of course it has an effect,

486
00:29:47.625 --> 00:29:50.005
and within, I cannot give you the meters,

487
00:29:50.005 --> 00:29:52.285
but within some time it will slow down the

488
00:29:52.285 --> 00:29:53.405
vessel and eventually stop it.

489
00:29:54.295 --> 00:29:55.295
Thank You. Thank you, sir.

490
00:29:57.105 --> 00:29:59.845
I'm gonna pass now back to Mr.

491
00:30:00.305 --> 00:30:02.325
Par, I think is probably right,

492
00:30:02.325 --> 00:30:07.245
because you can then give us, um, a, uh, a response on

493
00:30:09.365 --> 00:30:12.245
i, the report of the simulations from, no,

494
00:30:12.325 --> 00:30:13.405
I, was it November 22?

495
00:30:13.545 --> 00:30:17.725
The, uh, in which the, uh, anchor drop of simulated?

496
00:30:18.985 --> 00:30:20.925
Yes, it was, sir. And you,

497
00:30:20.985 --> 00:30:24.165
you certainly found a satisfactory response under those

498
00:30:24.165 --> 00:30:27.325
conditions and an arrest of the, uh,

499
00:30:27.585 --> 00:30:31.925
of the drifting vehicle vessel in I think a hundred meters.

500
00:30:32.105 --> 00:30:34.325
But perhaps you can give us more detail on that

501
00:30:36.385 --> 00:30:40.525
Sir Mike Par, HR Wallingford representing ABP, uh,

502
00:30:41.065 --> 00:30:42.085
the, the description.

503
00:30:42.105 --> 00:30:44.005
So there was a 22nd pause

504
00:30:44.745 --> 00:30:48.085
put in place from when the engines were effectively stopped

505
00:30:48.085 --> 00:30:50.565
in the simulation before ya was let go.

506
00:30:51.035 --> 00:30:54.525
That was agreed at the time of the simulation, based on the,

507
00:30:54.545 --> 00:30:57.125
the input from all the, um, Mariners present, and,

508
00:30:57.425 --> 00:31:00.665
and I think I'd agree with, um, the DFDS

509
00:31:00.665 --> 00:31:03.785
that whether it's 20 seconds or 30 seconds, or 10 seconds

510
00:31:03.805 --> 00:31:08.385
or 15 seconds, um, that there will be a a, a space of time.

511
00:31:08.485 --> 00:31:09.985
20 seconds was what was used.

512
00:31:10.365 --> 00:31:13.585

The vessel was stopped, um, I think within, um,

513
00:31:13.825 --> 00:31:17.705
within a hundred meters on, on this case, um, with wind

514
00:31:17.805 --> 00:31:20.585
and tide setting towards the IOT uhhuh.

515
00:31:20.805 --> 00:31:22.905
So it was effective as a precaution.

516
00:31:24.725 --> 00:31:26.985
So to Mr. Hannon.

517
00:31:27.045 --> 00:31:29.545
Now, in terms of the risk assessment, overall,

518
00:31:36.575 --> 00:31:40.985
this hundred meter, uh, arrest distance was

519
00:31:42.815 --> 00:31:44.225
then subsequently assessed.

520
00:31:45.805 --> 00:31:50.065
And tell us a little bit more about what, how that, um,

521
00:31:50.495 --> 00:31:52.025
then was considered

522
00:31:52.285 --> 00:31:56.745
and looked at as whether it was going to make that risk

523
00:31:57.515 --> 00:31:58.585
acceptable or not.

524
00:32:05.275 --> 00:32:06.585
James, Hannah, ABP mayor.

525
00:32:06.645 --> 00:32:11.145
Um, it, uh, it fundamentally didn't really change the,

526
00:32:11.205 --> 00:32:15.025
the outcome, uh, the, the, uh, vessels were, were seen

527
00:32:15.025 --> 00:32:17.305
to be, uh, adequately arrested.

528
00:32:17.965 --> 00:32:20.505
So, uh, looking at the, the, the risk assessment

529
00:32:20.525 --> 00:32:22.425
and how it was assessed, um,

530
00:32:22.645 --> 00:32:23.905
and the, the information

531
00:32:23.905 --> 00:32:25.625
that was passed was from, from the simulations.

532
00:32:25.625 --> 00:32:26.945
It didn't change the outcome.

533
00:32:29.215 --> 00:32:32.545
What if the, uh, reaction time were 40 seconds

534
00:32:32.805 --> 00:32:36.025
and the arrest distance with 200 meters, would

535
00:32:36.025 --> 00:32:38.745
that have made a difference to the assessment made?

536
00:32:45.065 --> 00:32:47.445
So it could, of course, it could make a, a change to the,

537
00:32:47.445 --> 00:32:48.725
what the assessment which was made,

538
00:32:48.725 --> 00:32:51.925
but it depends where the, uh, breakdown occurred.

539
00:32:52.305 --> 00:32:56.325

So clearly the, the closer you get to the, um,

540
00:32:56.325 --> 00:32:58.805
infrastructure, the less time you have to respond.

541
00:32:58.825 --> 00:33:00.845
But equally, the, the less time there is

542
00:33:00.845 --> 00:33:02.445
for a breakdown to, to take place.

543
00:33:02.605 --> 00:33:04.685
I think, uh, just looking back at my notes,

544
00:33:04.905 --> 00:33:06.645
the the other part of this,

545
00:33:06.655 --> 00:33:09.405
there was extensive conversations at the time within the

546
00:33:09.405 --> 00:33:11.525
simulation team, is whether it was viable

547
00:33:11.555 --> 00:33:14.845
that you would have a two engine breakdown on this class

548
00:33:14.845 --> 00:33:16.405
of vessel with the redundancy

549
00:33:16.825 --> 00:33:18.245
and the setup of, of the engine.

550
00:33:18.305 --> 00:33:21.645
So in terms of the risk assessment, I, I would've expected

551
00:33:21.875 --> 00:33:23.085
that the combination of,

552
00:33:23.865 --> 00:33:25.765
can both engines break down at the same time?

553
00:33:25.765 --> 00:33:27.605
What's the, what's the chance of that?

554
00:33:27.705 --> 00:33:30.605
And then if that does happen, is it reasonable

555
00:33:30.605 --> 00:33:32.725
to expect the anchors to be deployed in what sort of time?

556
00:33:33.225 --> 00:33:37.205
And then is 100 meters from the anchor deployment position?

557
00:33:37.545 --> 00:33:39.965
And it's a total sum of that, which I would've expected

558
00:33:39.965 --> 00:33:41.365
to be seen in the NRA.

559
00:33:42.075 --> 00:33:45.685
Yeah. Thank you. That's, that's much clearer.

560
00:33:46.465 --> 00:33:47.965
Um, to the harbor.

561
00:33:47.965 --> 00:33:52.485
Must Humber, uh, this seems to be to speak then

562
00:33:52.625 --> 00:33:57.285
to the, uh, operating controls on vessels

563
00:33:57.825 --> 00:34:02.685
and the, um, to a certain extent the, uh,

564
00:34:03.565 --> 00:34:07.085
restrictions on vessels that would be permitted to

565
00:34:08.465 --> 00:34:11.725
safely navigate at this proposed development.

566
00:34:12.225 --> 00:34:15.445

Um, do you see that it will be essential

567
00:34:15.465 --> 00:34:18.285
to have twin engine vessels on this development?

568
00:34:21.945 --> 00:34:23.805
Andrew Furman Harbor Master Humber?

569
00:34:25.945 --> 00:34:30.125
The, The twin engine gives the redundancy.

570
00:34:30.265 --> 00:34:31.885
That's, that's correcting that assessment

571
00:34:32.265 --> 00:34:33.765
and that will help that vessel

572
00:34:34.065 --> 00:34:36.165
to have a much wider operating window.

573
00:34:36.625 --> 00:34:39.365
If I, if I took an example of a vessel

574
00:34:39.435 --> 00:34:42.245
that was an imaginary vessel that was likely to break down,

575
00:34:42.595 --> 00:34:45.245
then that one's operating window would only be on the flood

576
00:34:45.245 --> 00:34:46.765
tide, perhaps on a window.

577
00:34:47.385 --> 00:34:51.605
So it's a sliding scale of managing the risks

578
00:34:51.605 --> 00:34:54.365
that we're presented with, which isn't a throwaway comment,

579
00:34:54.545 --> 00:34:56.445
but depending on what we've got,

580
00:34:56.445 --> 00:34:59.125
that will depend on the amount of risk control measures

581
00:34:59.125 --> 00:35:00.925
that are there and whether the operation is,

582
00:35:01.025 --> 00:35:03.525
can go ahead in those conditions or, or at all.

583
00:35:04.985 --> 00:35:07.965
So if I try to paraphrase,

584
00:35:08.795 --> 00:35:10.885
it's vessel specific, is that correct?

585
00:35:11.395 --> 00:35:13.725
That that is correct. Yeah. Okay.

586
00:35:15.335 --> 00:35:17.325
There, sorry, just to say, so there are,

587
00:35:17.325 --> 00:35:19.965
there are broad principles based on the experience

588
00:35:19.985 --> 00:35:21.725
of vessels coming and going all the time,

589
00:35:21.725 --> 00:35:23.645
that perhaps we could make some assumptions on.

590
00:35:24.105 --> 00:35:26.845
But I realizing this situation, there's some very specific,

591
00:35:27.265 --> 00:35:28.965
um, things being talked about.

592
00:35:29.025 --> 00:35:31.325
But, um, in general, there are,

593
00:35:31.325 --> 00:35:33.245

there are different horses for different courses.

594
00:35:35.145 --> 00:35:40.045
Is there anywhere else, uh, in your jurisdiction where

595
00:35:41.505 --> 00:35:45.645
you do have, um, anchor drop as a, as a a,

596
00:35:45.925 --> 00:35:47.285
a very specific risk control?

597
00:35:49.105 --> 00:35:50.125
Uh, yes, there are.

598
00:35:50.385 --> 00:35:54.885
Um, in, in general seamanship, um, an anchor is a, is a,

599
00:35:54.905 --> 00:35:56.965
is a control that's available to the master

600
00:35:56.965 --> 00:36:00.005
and pilot anyway, but particularly, um, in the upper reaches

601
00:36:00.005 --> 00:36:03.885
of the Humber, anchors are still used to swing around on,

602
00:36:03.885 --> 00:36:04.965
on the river's trend news.

603
00:36:05.585 --> 00:36:07.685
And if particularly where a vessel is trying

604
00:36:07.685 --> 00:36:09.645
to navigate into the wind, it will quite up

605
00:36:09.645 --> 00:36:11.565
and drop its outboard anchor

606
00:36:11.825 --> 00:36:13.685
and pull against that as a break.

607
00:36:13.985 --> 00:36:15.525
And that's a, a recognized

608
00:36:15.845 --> 00:36:17.085
maneuvering technique on the Humber.

609
00:36:17.145 --> 00:36:20.765
Mm-Hmm. So it's not only for emergencies, it's also for,

610
00:36:20.865 --> 00:36:22.925
for assisting with, uh, maneuvers as well.

611
00:36:24.065 --> 00:36:27.245
And what about, um, readiness

612
00:36:27.245 --> 00:36:28.965
for anchor drop as a, as a control?

613
00:36:28.965 --> 00:36:33.685
Is this something that is, uh, is, is part of your existing,

614
00:36:33.865 --> 00:36:36.405
um, uh, uh, directions,

615
00:36:36.705 --> 00:36:40.125
or is it something that you feel could be, uh, uh,

616
00:36:40.575 --> 00:36:44.125
introduced and, uh, uh, uh, to be effective,

617
00:36:45.945 --> 00:36:47.605
Uh, any vessel and under pilotage?

618
00:36:47.645 --> 00:36:49.725
I would expect to have the anchors ready to go.

619
00:36:49.865 --> 00:36:52.085
As, uh, captain Nielsen alluded to,

620
00:36:52.965 --> 00:36:55.485

I think in this situation, in, in peak conditions,

621
00:36:55.825 --> 00:36:57.925
et cetera, I think there would be a, a very clear

622
00:36:58.735 --> 00:37:00.005
focus around that.

623
00:37:00.185 --> 00:37:01.765
So I'm not suggesting that any

624
00:37:01.765 --> 00:37:03.965
of the vessels are anything less than completely ready to,

625
00:37:04.065 --> 00:37:07.925
to drop the anchor, but that is clearly, we, we focus on,

626
00:37:07.945 --> 00:37:10.205
on what's important in circumstances.

627
00:37:19.555 --> 00:37:22.805
Does I ot have any further to add on that point? I think

628
00:37:22.805 --> 00:37:24.205
Captain Bassett wishes to say something

629
00:37:25.445 --> 00:37:29.445
I, Nigel Bassett for iot, um,

630
00:37:30.965 --> 00:37:33.725
I was present in the November 22 simulations

631
00:37:33.785 --> 00:37:37.645
and witnessed the two anchor drops that were done, um,

632
00:37:38.025 --> 00:37:40.245
to simulate an emergency scenario.

633
00:37:41.265 --> 00:37:43.885
Um, what I would say on, on both

634
00:37:43.885 --> 00:37:45.925
of those was I think the outcome

635
00:37:46.145 --> 00:37:49.405
as simulated was absolutely the best case scenario

636
00:37:49.715 --> 00:37:54.245
that you could ever wish for, um, for the following reasons.

637
00:37:55.335 --> 00:37:58.365
First of all, the assumption was made that on that glass

638
00:37:58.365 --> 00:38:01.005
of vessel, the anchors had dropped from bridge control,

639
00:38:02.315 --> 00:38:04.765
therefore they could be dropped immediately

640
00:38:04.765 --> 00:38:08.485
by the bridge team and they could both be dropped together.

641
00:38:11.825 --> 00:38:15.285
In my experience of probably 8,000 ships,

642
00:38:16.225 --> 00:38:18.365
remote control of the anchors from the bridge

643
00:38:18.665 --> 00:38:20.485
is absolutely a rare luxury.

644
00:38:22.705 --> 00:38:24.565
And even if that facility existed,

645
00:38:25.315 --> 00:38:26.805
it's not actually guaranteed

646
00:38:26.805 --> 00:38:28.285
to work 'cause it's rarely tested.

647
00:38:32.395 --> 00:38:36.845

Another thing I would say is that the need

648
00:38:36.845 --> 00:38:41.765
to drop anchors will potentially more regularly be

649
00:38:41.765 --> 00:38:45.525
triggered by a loss of control system than by a loss

650
00:38:45.525 --> 00:38:46.925
of actual engine themselves.

651
00:38:49.225 --> 00:38:50.485
And therefore, the feasibility

652
00:38:50.485 --> 00:38:52.645
of losing both engines once is

653
00:38:53.395 --> 00:38:56.365
perhaps greater than has been indicated.

654
00:38:58.755 --> 00:39:01.725
Another issue is in that particular location,

655
00:39:03.085 --> 00:39:06.725
I think it's been recognized that the preferred place for

656
00:39:07.405 --> 00:39:12.165
securing a forward tug is once the ship has come past iot,

657
00:39:12.245 --> 00:39:15.325
main jetty turned in towards the I maneuvering area,

658
00:39:16.035 --> 00:39:18.925
started its turn or even finished its turn,

659
00:39:18.945 --> 00:39:22.725
and then the forward tug secures if something goes wrong in

660
00:39:22.725 --> 00:39:24.525
that, in that period while the,

661
00:39:24.525 --> 00:39:27.125
while the row row is maneuvering inside the line

662
00:39:27.125 --> 00:39:31.965
of the main jetty, Then the time that the order is given

663
00:39:32.385 --> 00:39:36.245
to deploy the anchors, there may well be a tug forward right

664
00:39:36.245 --> 00:39:40.845
underneath them, in which case that tug would have

665
00:39:40.845 --> 00:39:44.285
to be cleared outta the way, well outta the way

666
00:39:44.285 --> 00:39:47.085
before anybody would dare touch an anchor control

667
00:39:52.305 --> 00:39:55.445
the speed at which those anchors was dropped

668
00:39:55.505 --> 00:39:56.565
in the simulations.

669
00:39:57.425 --> 00:40:00.765
Um, I'm not indicating whether that was representative

670
00:40:00.905 --> 00:40:03.605
or not, but just to be aware, um,

671
00:40:04.365 --> 00:40:05.885
I think it was about one and a half knots.

672
00:40:05.885 --> 00:40:10.085
Was it? Yeah, it was a year ago.

673
00:40:10.085 --> 00:40:12.325
Anyway, um, it, it's, it's written in the,

674
00:40:12.325 --> 00:40:13.525

in the simulation reports,

675
00:40:13.705 --> 00:40:15.165
but again, um,

676
00:40:18.985 --> 00:40:21.205
The kinetic energy involved in a ship moving,

677
00:40:21.225 --> 00:40:25.365
if you drop an anchor, um, the, obviously the power,

678
00:40:25.425 --> 00:40:28.005
the holding power required of that anchor, again,

679
00:40:28.105 --> 00:40:30.245
is proportionate to the speed of the ship squared.

680
00:40:30.705 --> 00:40:33.485
So if you drop it at one knot, one times,

681
00:40:33.665 --> 00:40:37.765
one times a constant is quite a, um,

682
00:40:38.605 --> 00:40:40.565
a low amount of kinetic energy to rest.

683
00:40:40.705 --> 00:40:41.845
If you do it at two knots

684
00:40:41.845 --> 00:40:44.365
because you've maybe delayed the decision to drop it

685
00:40:44.545 --> 00:40:47.125
or made a couple of phone calls to the engine room

686
00:40:47.185 --> 00:40:51.005
or whatever, whatever the case may be, then two times two,

687
00:40:52.165 --> 00:40:55.365
a a, a doubling of speed certainly becomes a quadrupling

688
00:40:55.365 --> 00:40:56.965
of amount of holding power you need.

689
00:40:57.585 --> 00:40:59.045
If you're having a particularly bad day

690
00:40:59.045 --> 00:41:01.645
and you don't get it dropped until the shippers has starting

691
00:41:01.665 --> 00:41:04.085
to do four locks over the ground, for example,

692
00:41:04.085 --> 00:41:06.925
with a strong ed tide, which wouldn't take long to happen.

693
00:41:07.945 --> 00:41:10.205
Um, you're then looking at four times four,

694
00:41:10.205 --> 00:41:11.925
which is 16 times the constant.

695
00:41:11.945 --> 00:41:13.285
You can quickly see that the,

696
00:41:13.425 --> 00:41:16.805
the speed at which the anchor dropped is absolutely, um,

697
00:41:19.555 --> 00:41:23.365
well, it, it will, it will, it it'll affect the outcome, um,

698
00:41:23.435 --> 00:41:25.405
exponentially, essentially, or,

699
00:41:25.465 --> 00:41:27.885
or the, the likelihood of those anchors holding

700
00:41:28.455 --> 00:41:30.085
being exponentially negative.

701
00:41:33.585 --> 00:41:37.925

Mm-Hmm. Final point is that

702
00:41:38.825 --> 00:41:41.085
row, row vessels, because of the nature of their trade,

703
00:41:41.675 --> 00:41:43.485
very rarely drop anchors.

704
00:41:44.185 --> 00:41:45.805
Um, and we're assuming

705
00:41:45.835 --> 00:41:47.365
that actually when the brakes are let off

706
00:41:47.365 --> 00:41:48.485
those anchors deploy.

707
00:41:49.195 --> 00:41:52.405
Generally they would do, but you can never guarantee it.

708
00:41:52.405 --> 00:41:54.125
Sometimes they will need some persuasion.

709
00:41:54.125 --> 00:41:56.885
You have to put the, the windless in gear, um,

710
00:41:57.495 --> 00:41:59.645
start them walking out into power

711
00:41:59.645 --> 00:42:01.525
and let then let them go on the brake.

712
00:42:01.625 --> 00:42:04.605
So, um, I'm coming up with the, the, the doom

713
00:42:04.605 --> 00:42:06.125
to doomsday scenario, if you like,

714
00:42:06.625 --> 00:42:11.085
but my point is that rarely would everything be as ideal as

715
00:42:11.775 --> 00:42:16.285
those prevised, um, emergency scenarios that were simulated.

716
00:42:19.535 --> 00:42:21.085
Thank you, captain President, uh,

717
00:42:21.325 --> 00:42:22.405
anything further from DFS

718
00:42:23.325 --> 00:42:24.845
Isabella to fourth DFDS?

719
00:42:24.845 --> 00:42:26.645
I think Mr. Priest would like to add a couple of points

720
00:42:27.705 --> 00:42:29.725
Yes, brought priests for DFDS.

721
00:42:29.835 --> 00:42:32.765
It's a more of a contextual comment, really.

722
00:42:32.985 --> 00:42:36.405
Um, and, but effectively, if, if I think as, uh, the,

723
00:42:36.485 --> 00:42:37.645
IT had had alluded to

724
00:42:37.645 --> 00:42:41.805
before, if, if we consider, say, a, a four knot drift speed

725
00:42:42.145 --> 00:42:45.925
of a vessel, uh, that's about two meters per second.

726
00:42:46.305 --> 00:42:51.125
So a 22nd, uh, delay, shall we say, into drop,

727
00:42:51.125 --> 00:42:53.285
that anchor would cover 40 meters.

728
00:42:54.465 --> 00:42:58.965

Um, there is then the time to let the anchor drop, uh,

729
00:42:58.965 --> 00:43:02.165
to let the chain out, to hold the anchor, then

730
00:43:02.165 --> 00:43:03.205
for the anchor to embed

731
00:43:04.505 --> 00:43:08.925
before there is any resisting force placed on that anchor

732
00:43:09.105 --> 00:43:10.365
to, to arrest the vessel.

733
00:43:11.145 --> 00:43:13.605
At which point, and as you correctly pointed out

734
00:43:13.605 --> 00:43:15.645
before, it's the inertia of the vessel, the momentum

735
00:43:15.645 --> 00:43:17.925
of the vessel, that would prevent

736
00:43:17.925 --> 00:43:19.685
that from happening instantaneously.

737
00:43:20.505 --> 00:43:23.485
And there would be quite an extensive drag period and,

738
00:43:24.065 --> 00:43:27.645
and restraining period required in that as well.

739
00:43:28.305 --> 00:43:33.165
So within your, your earlier figure of 100 meters,

740
00:43:34.395 --> 00:43:35.965
with all those things considered,

741
00:43:35.965 --> 00:43:39.325
there'll be very little time available for the anchor with

742
00:43:39.865 --> 00:43:43.005
any sort of effective holding power to

743
00:43:44.545 --> 00:43:48.725
arrest a, a vessel carrying of that much momentum of a,

744
00:43:48.725 --> 00:43:50.085
of such a large displacement vessel.

745
00:43:53.455 --> 00:43:55.325
Thank you, Mr. Priest. We,

746
00:43:55.335 --> 00:43:59.365
we've heard from the applicant's team that in this

747
00:43:59.915 --> 00:44:04.285
context, we are looking at a, a, a kind of bundled risk,

748
00:44:06.065 --> 00:44:08.845
uh, and the risk assessment

749
00:44:09.065 --> 00:44:12.125
to date has considered this in the round.

750
00:44:13.135 --> 00:44:15.045
We've given it quite a lot of time this afternoon.

751
00:44:15.745 --> 00:44:20.165
Um, I'd just like your observation on whether

752
00:44:21.425 --> 00:44:24.685
due to the constraints of covering quite a large number

753
00:44:24.685 --> 00:44:28.125
of hazards in the has ID workshops, um,

754
00:44:29.555 --> 00:44:32.045
whether we've been given,

755
00:44:32.095 --> 00:44:34.925

we've given it more consideration this afternoon

756
00:44:35.105 --> 00:44:38.765
that's been given cons than it's been given in

757
00:44:39.725 --> 00:44:41.125
workshops together with stakeholders.

758
00:44:42.915 --> 00:44:45.605
Have we gone further today than we, than, than the,

759
00:44:45.605 --> 00:44:49.805
than than the collected, uh, uh,

760
00:44:50.075 --> 00:44:53.525
personnel went a in November 22,

761
00:44:54.165 --> 00:44:55.245
actually, sorry, earlier than that,

762
00:44:55.805 --> 00:44:58.485
Isabella for DFDS, um, Mr.

763
00:44:58.485 --> 00:44:59.765
Priest wasn't at the workshop,

764
00:44:59.765 --> 00:45:01.925
so I'm not sure he can respond directly to that,

765
00:45:01.945 --> 00:45:04.685
but I wonder if Captain Nelson may be able to thank you.

766
00:45:07.265 --> 00:45:10.365
Yes. But he listened on, uh, on behalf of, uh, of D ft s.

767
00:45:10.865 --> 00:45:13.205
Uh, yes. I, I think it's a fair summary that, uh,

768
00:45:13.205 --> 00:45:15.765
that you come up with that, that we have spent more time,

769
00:45:16.305 --> 00:45:18.445
we have spent more time this afternoon, I think, uh,

770
00:45:18.995 --> 00:45:20.005
talking about it

771
00:45:20.025 --> 00:45:22.925
and, uh, alluding to it than we did at, uh, hazards, uh,

772
00:45:23.245 --> 00:45:26.805
workshops, which were not conducted in, uh, in a very,

773
00:45:26.945 --> 00:45:28.205
uh, good atmosphere.

774
00:45:28.705 --> 00:45:30.565
All of them, if I'm honest. Thanks.

775
00:45:33.395 --> 00:45:34.685
Same question to I, ot.

776
00:45:37.365 --> 00:45:38.485
I don't think we've got anything to add

777
00:45:38.485 --> 00:45:40.085
to the ft s Thank you.

778
00:45:42.995 --> 00:45:47.085
From the comments that we made this afternoon, uh, to Mr.

779
00:45:47.235 --> 00:45:52.045
Hann, does this lead uh, you to

780
00:45:52.565 --> 00:45:56.245
consider that you've had additional representation from

781
00:45:56.245 --> 00:46:00.085
stakeholders today that are useful in the risk assessment

782
00:46:00.345 --> 00:46:01.485

that's been carried out

783
00:46:01.825 --> 00:46:05.845
and should lead to a reassessment of that risk?

784
00:46:10.185 --> 00:46:14.325
Mr. Powell? Mr. Powell just wanted to respond on some

785
00:46:14.325 --> 00:46:16.965
of the points first, but I, I take it in either order.

786
00:46:16.995 --> 00:46:20.085
This, this really goes to the risk assessment, um, uh,

787
00:46:20.085 --> 00:46:23.805
rather than the simulation, but yeah, uh, we'll have Mr.

788
00:46:23.805 --> 00:46:25.045
Hannon first and then Mr. Par

789
00:46:50.375 --> 00:46:51.375
And Tim was there.

790
00:46:51.505 --> 00:46:53.915
Yeah, James Han for the, uh, um, for ABP.

791
00:46:54.055 --> 00:46:56.635
Um, I believe that it was, it was covered in the, in the,

792
00:46:56.855 --> 00:46:59.075
the final has ID workshop.

793
00:46:59.735 --> 00:47:02.475
Um, I believe the engagement was, was undertaken and,

794
00:47:02.535 --> 00:47:06.275
and we, we had adequate input to undertake the, uh,

795
00:47:06.355 --> 00:47:08.955
a comprehensive risk assessment with the information

796
00:47:08.955 --> 00:47:11.955
that we, we had following the, the simulations at that time.

797
00:47:12.055 --> 00:47:14.315
So we're looking at the, at November now.

798
00:47:14.335 --> 00:47:18.155
So I believe that in, in the final, final has ID workshop,

799
00:47:18.235 --> 00:47:19.955
then we did have enough information.

800
00:47:21.455 --> 00:47:22.635
Now, this was undertaken

801
00:47:22.765 --> 00:47:27.755
after the, um, the, the, um, uh, senior management,

802
00:47:28.175 --> 00:47:30.885
um, the workshops

803
00:47:31.105 --> 00:47:35.365
and the, uh, the, the, the, the, the risk assessment phase

804
00:47:35.435 --> 00:47:37.045
that was undertaken in October.

805
00:47:38.585 --> 00:47:41.725
Um, so the question is, from what you've heard,

806
00:47:44.225 --> 00:47:46.405
do you still stand by that, uh, risk assessed

807
00:47:46.585 --> 00:47:49.045
or does it need, uh, reassessment

808
00:47:49.585 --> 00:47:51.405
during the process of this examination?

809
00:47:53.255 --> 00:47:54.485

James had an EBP.

810
00:47:54.585 --> 00:47:58.045
Um, I, I believe that the risk assessment is robust enough

811
00:47:58.105 --> 00:48:00.925
to, to, to deal with these, these, with

812
00:48:00.925 --> 00:48:02.645
what we've been discussing over the last, uh,

813
00:48:02.755 --> 00:48:05.885
last few hours, I believe it is, is unchanged.

814
00:48:07.095 --> 00:48:10.765
Thank you. And to, um, Harbor Master Humber, from

815
00:48:10.995 --> 00:48:12.445
what you've heard, um,

816
00:48:12.725 --> 00:48:16.085
'cause this speaks obviously to the controls

817
00:48:16.085 --> 00:48:18.565
that can be applied to this hazard,

818
00:48:19.585 --> 00:48:23.605
and, uh, we've heard quite a lot about both

819
00:48:25.265 --> 00:48:29.285
the, um, consequence or potential consequence.

820
00:48:30.205 --> 00:48:32.765
Admittedly, what we've been hearing is, uh,

821
00:48:33.285 --> 00:48:35.565
probably a worst imaginable rather than the most likely

822
00:48:35.595 --> 00:48:40.205
consequence in terms of, um,

823
00:48:40.205 --> 00:48:42.045
the controls that can be applied

824
00:48:43.105 --> 00:48:46.085
and managed

825
00:48:48.505 --> 00:48:50.605
by the S-H-A-S-C-N-A.

826
00:48:53.225 --> 00:48:54.965
Do you still feel comfortable from

827
00:48:54.965 --> 00:48:56.005
what you've heard this afternoon,

828
00:48:57.785 --> 00:49:00.085
Uh, Andrew Furman Harbormaster Humber

829
00:49:00.955 --> 00:49:02.285
with regards to consequence?

830
00:49:02.445 --> 00:49:05.165
A absolutely. Um, you know, the consequence

831
00:49:05.225 --> 00:49:07.965
of the impact on the trunk wear is, has come out

832
00:49:07.965 --> 00:49:09.885
of the has ID workshops loud and clear.

833
00:49:09.905 --> 00:49:13.005
So if, if it's not clear that that's been received, then I,

834
00:49:13.165 --> 00:49:15.885
I would put that absolutely, that is the risk

835
00:49:15.885 --> 00:49:19.125
that I am looking to manage, uh, moving forward

836
00:49:20.465 --> 00:49:24.485

in regard to the probability and some of the ifs, ands

837
00:49:24.485 --> 00:49:26.725
and where falls that we've gone through in regards

838
00:49:26.745 --> 00:49:27.765
to anchoring.

839
00:49:28.725 --> 00:49:30.125
I wouldn't normally line that many

840
00:49:30.645 --> 00:49:32.005
unlikely scenarios up together

841
00:49:32.505 --> 00:49:34.765
for any situation of any consequence.

842
00:49:34.905 --> 00:49:36.125
So that could be applied to any,

843
00:49:36.225 --> 00:49:37.485
any shipping operation on the home,

844
00:49:37.485 --> 00:49:38.965
but that would not be normal.

845
00:49:39.305 --> 00:49:42.565
But bearing in mind the consequence, clearly that's the,

846
00:49:42.565 --> 00:49:44.485
that's the risk that needs to be managed.

847
00:49:45.385 --> 00:49:48.125
So at the moment, there's been some work done on, um,

848
00:49:48.745 --> 00:49:50.085
anchor as a stop.

849
00:49:50.475 --> 00:49:52.925
There's how many redundancy, uh,

850
00:49:53.025 --> 00:49:54.285
the particular vessel has got.

851
00:49:54.785 --> 00:49:57.685
So that all needs to be put in, in a specific situation.

852
00:49:58.305 --> 00:50:02.405
If that isn't, um, enough on its own, then it's flood tide,

853
00:50:02.475 --> 00:50:04.485
then it's not in extreme conditions.

854
00:50:04.705 --> 00:50:07.485
So it all goes into the final evaluation,

855
00:50:07.545 --> 00:50:09.485
and that's what we will do through our risk assessment

856
00:50:09.485 --> 00:50:12.085
should the, um, facility to be be built,

857
00:50:12.505 --> 00:50:14.045
but we will manage that risk.

858
00:50:15.865 --> 00:50:19.845
So if, if I could try to characterize this, you have a,

859
00:50:19.845 --> 00:50:23.845
if you like a, uh, a series of potential risk controls

860
00:50:24.065 --> 00:50:25.845
and you'd be looking at how far down

861
00:50:25.845 --> 00:50:27.205
that series you need to go.

862
00:50:29.075 --> 00:50:31.965
That, that's correct. And I'd be very open about that in,

863
00:50:32.065 --> 00:50:35.725

at this stage, because if those windows

864
00:50:36.295 --> 00:50:37.445
close up too tightly

865
00:50:37.505 --> 00:50:38.925
or those those are thing,

866
00:50:38.925 --> 00:50:41.645
then obviously commercially that comes into it.

867
00:50:41.705 --> 00:50:44.325
But that will, what it costs

868
00:50:45.375 --> 00:50:48.765
won't affect our ability to apply the controls.

869
00:50:48.765 --> 00:50:50.685
We will require the controls based on the

870
00:50:50.685 --> 00:50:51.965
consequence of the incident.

871
00:50:56.695 --> 00:50:58.885
Thank you, your Honor. Kevin Ferman, um,

872
00:51:17.505 --> 00:51:19.695
we've just, um, taken a view

873
00:51:19.695 --> 00:51:23.215
that it would be in everybody's interest to, to press on,

874
00:51:23.315 --> 00:51:26.255
but, um, slightly outta sequence from the original plan

875
00:51:26.255 --> 00:51:28.095
because of what we talked about earlier on.

876
00:51:28.405 --> 00:51:33.175
What I'd like to do is to look at the, um, the,

877
00:51:33.235 --> 00:51:35.455
the suggestion that

878
00:51:38.835 --> 00:51:42.135
the safety matters here have a bearing on the potential

879
00:51:42.135 --> 00:51:46.255
marine congestion of, uh, the port.

880
00:51:47.115 --> 00:51:50.295
So if we could, um, what I would like

881
00:51:50.295 --> 00:51:52.095
to do first, bear with me.

882
00:52:03.035 --> 00:52:07.575
So this is item two F uh,

883
00:52:08.395 --> 00:52:09.695
now firstly, um,

884
00:52:29.365 --> 00:52:31.865
Mr. Gould will start this off on two F.

885
00:52:40.405 --> 00:52:44.785
Um, first question on direct towards, uh, DFDS.

886
00:52:45.125 --> 00:52:49.345
Um, I think somebody in the, in the,

887
00:52:49.365 --> 00:52:50.905
is in the room from Stenner,

888
00:52:51.145 --> 00:52:54.985
although wasn't necessarily planning on answering questions.

889
00:52:55.965 --> 00:53:00.145
Um, this question could equally apply

890
00:53:00.145 --> 00:53:02.385

to Stenner if you feel able to answer the question.

891
00:53:03.085 --> 00:53:06.625
Um, but just looking at the routes

892
00:53:06.625 --> 00:53:08.225
that are currently being operated to

893
00:53:08.225 --> 00:53:11.385
and from Immingham, um,

894
00:53:12.485 --> 00:53:16.145
can you give us an indication of the sorts of, uh, normal

895
00:53:17.185 --> 00:53:18.985
voyage durations for each

896
00:53:18.985 --> 00:53:20.385
of the routes that you're currently operating?

897
00:53:24.255 --> 00:53:27.365
Good Afternoon. Andrew Byrne of DFDS? Yes.

898
00:53:27.365 --> 00:53:31.845
So weer currently run, uh, four scheduled liner services.

899
00:53:32.305 --> 00:53:36.045
So these vessels run at the same time, e every day, uh,

900
00:53:36.325 --> 00:53:38.845
regardless of traffic levels, uh, we have, uh,

901
00:53:39.025 --> 00:53:42.125
six services a week that go between our terminal v Laham,

902
00:53:42.125 --> 00:53:44.645
which is Rotterdam and Immingham,

903
00:53:45.345 --> 00:53:48.965
and that's approximately a 12 hour, uh, crossing.

904
00:53:51.945 --> 00:53:55.085
We, uh, have a service that runs between Cooks Avenue

905
00:53:55.625 --> 00:53:57.645
in Germany and Immingham,

906
00:53:58.345 --> 00:54:01.805
and that's approximately a 20 hour crossing.

907
00:54:05.555 --> 00:54:09.445
Then we run from, uh, Berg in Denmark to Ingham,

908
00:54:09.445 --> 00:54:13.565
which again, six days a week, which is a 22 hour crossing.

909
00:54:16.505 --> 00:54:19.725
And finally, Gothenburg in Sweden,

910
00:54:19.975 --> 00:54:23.405
which is a approximately 22 hour crossing as well.

911
00:54:24.705 --> 00:54:27.485
We also operate other services for third parties.

912
00:54:27.745 --> 00:54:32.285
So, um, sea cargo between, uh, Norwegian ports,

913
00:54:32.545 --> 00:54:34.085
um, and Immingham,

914
00:54:34.265 --> 00:54:37.285
and Im Skip, which is the Icelandic, uh, FISH services

915
00:54:37.285 --> 00:54:39.445
that call, uh, two or three times a week.

916
00:54:39.785 --> 00:54:42.285
But the DFDS core services are the ones I've just mentioned.

917
00:54:44.875 --> 00:54:49.645

Just a quick interjection, is that, uh, time, uh, from

918
00:54:50.265 --> 00:54:51.285
Unring to birthing?

919
00:54:52.625 --> 00:54:53.805
Uh, yes, it is. Um,

920
00:54:53.905 --> 00:54:57.445
and it's probably also, sorry, Andrew Burn for DFDS, um,

921
00:54:57.705 --> 00:54:59.565
and it's probably worth adding as well.

922
00:54:59.785 --> 00:55:02.645
Um, in terms of how we do our port operation, one of our,

923
00:55:03.145 --> 00:55:06.965
our core strategic pillars is our reduction in CO two.

924
00:55:07.425 --> 00:55:12.365
So, um, less, uh, slower sailing, uh, emitting less CO two.

925
00:55:12.705 --> 00:55:14.925
So those times have been recently extended

926
00:55:14.945 --> 00:55:16.405
to the ones I've just given you now.

927
00:55:16.465 --> 00:55:18.125
So the port operation

928
00:55:18.145 --> 00:55:21.405
and how efficient it is, is absolutely critical to allow us

929
00:55:21.405 --> 00:55:23.125
to steam at the right speed,

930
00:55:23.225 --> 00:55:26.685
and they are that they are, uh, port point to point, um,

931
00:55:26.715 --> 00:55:27.965
release to arrival.

932
00:55:38.665 --> 00:55:42.235
Alright. In, in terms of those schedules, um,

933
00:55:42.735 --> 00:55:46.555
how sensitive are they to possible delays in terms

934
00:55:46.555 --> 00:55:48.035
of arrivals or departures?

935
00:55:49.695 --> 00:55:52.075
Andrew Byrne from DFDS, um, our,

936
00:55:52.895 --> 00:55:56.235
our services from Scandinavia certainly, uh,

937
00:55:56.235 --> 00:55:57.995
through the winter months are more susceptible

938
00:55:57.995 --> 00:56:01.115
because of the open sea routes in the fact it's a longer

939
00:56:01.475 --> 00:56:02.475
crossing they take.

940
00:56:03.095 --> 00:56:07.715
Um, certainly on the, um, on the Dutch service, uh,

941
00:56:07.945 --> 00:56:10.595
it's a service that, that, that can shelter the coast

942
00:56:10.595 --> 00:56:12.795
and the vessels that we've talked extensively about the

943
00:56:12.795 --> 00:56:16.515
modern yielding vessel is far, far, uh, better equipped to,

944
00:56:16.655 --> 00:56:18.355

to deal with more inclement weather.

945
00:56:19.175 --> 00:56:23.205
Um, but we do still get subject to delays

946
00:56:23.205 --> 00:56:26.485
and of course we, we are part of a quite intricate, um,

947
00:56:26.835 --> 00:56:28.885
port environment where there's a lot

948
00:56:28.885 --> 00:56:31.005
of composition in a very small, uh, area.

949
00:56:31.705 --> 00:56:33.405
So, um, if a,

950
00:56:33.485 --> 00:56:36.485
a small delay on your sea crossing can actually relate in

951
00:56:36.485 --> 00:56:38.485
quite a large delay once you arrive into the Humber.

952
00:56:56.935 --> 00:57:00.955
And then just looking at possible delays, um,

953
00:57:01.455 --> 00:57:06.275
can you give us a, a feel for just how significant, um,

954
00:57:07.795 --> 00:57:10.515
a delay might be in terms of either arriving or departing?

955
00:57:11.295 --> 00:57:13.355
Uh, in terms of what it does to the schedule,

956
00:57:15.735 --> 00:57:20.635
Andrew by, from DFDS, our Dutch service, uh,

957
00:57:20.635 --> 00:57:22.995
the Vlad and service is the schedule

958
00:57:23.065 --> 00:57:24.755
with the most resilience for that

959
00:57:24.755 --> 00:57:29.235
because it's, uh, it's in the port for about 12 hours a day.

960
00:57:29.235 --> 00:57:31.915
It's a, it's a market driven schedule,

961
00:57:32.175 --> 00:57:34.595
so it arrives in the morning and leaves in the evening.

962
00:57:34.775 --> 00:57:38.635
So that particular service can tolerate some delay,

963
00:57:38.935 --> 00:57:40.995
um, and recover.

964
00:57:41.305 --> 00:57:45.515
However, our other services, so if I, if I use the Denmark,

965
00:57:45.575 --> 00:57:50.235
the SBO service as an example, that's, um, 20 hours, uh,

966
00:57:50.295 --> 00:57:52.715
sea crossing, and it's only in port for five

967
00:57:53.255 --> 00:57:55.555
and has very little time to catch up.

968
00:57:55.575 --> 00:57:59.155
So if that vessel is delayed by anything more than 10

969
00:57:59.155 --> 00:58:03.955
or 15 minutes, um, we either have to burn excessive fuel

970
00:58:03.975 --> 00:58:05.595
to try and recover that time,

971
00:58:05.655 --> 00:58:09.315

or effectively the schedule is behind all week until the,

972
00:58:09.695 --> 00:58:10.915
the, the one day of the week

973
00:58:10.915 --> 00:58:13.675
that we don't have a sailing when it can recover.

974
00:58:35.395 --> 00:58:36.425
Thank you, Mr. Byrne.

975
00:58:36.525 --> 00:58:39.585
Um, is there anybody from Stenner that may be able to assist

976
00:58:39.855 --> 00:58:42.025
with their roots or is it something

977
00:58:42.025 --> 00:58:44.705
that the applicant might be able to deal with?

978
00:58:48.725 --> 00:58:52.985
Uh, master at, uh, Standal line on behalf of, uh, AVP,

979
00:58:53.525 --> 00:58:56.545
uh, Standal line runs, uh, two route from the Netherlands

980
00:58:56.545 --> 00:58:59.745
to, uh, one from, uh, hook of Holland to, uh, killing home

981
00:59:00.205 --> 00:59:02.785
and the other one from Rotterdam, euro port

982
00:59:03.045 --> 00:59:04.425
to Ingham at the moment.

983
00:59:04.565 --> 00:59:08.185
And the Ingham route is run with, uh, chartered vessels.

984
00:59:09.455 --> 00:59:12.385
Hook of Holland to kill home is approximately from key

985
00:59:12.385 --> 00:59:15.505
to key and, uh, 11 hour, uh, trip

986
00:59:16.005 --> 00:59:19.105
and, uh, trip backwards from, uh, killing on

987
00:59:19.105 --> 00:59:20.825
to go Holland can take a little bit longer.

988
00:59:20.955 --> 00:59:24.125
It's about 12 hours due to the departure

989
00:59:24.345 --> 00:59:25.565
and, uh, arrival times.

990
00:59:25.785 --> 00:59:29.645
The arrival times in Holland are separated

991
00:59:29.715 --> 00:59:32.005
because the big vessel vs.

992
00:59:32.005 --> 00:59:34.245
Orlandi car is coming in at eight o'clock in the morning

993
00:59:34.265 --> 00:59:35.565
and we have to arrive one hour

994
00:59:35.585 --> 00:59:38.765
and 50 minutes later due to the fact that the key can handle

995
00:59:39.505 --> 00:59:41.605
two vessels, which bring in an enormous

996
00:59:41.625 --> 00:59:42.805
amount of, uh, freight.

997
00:59:43.025 --> 00:59:46.685
So that's why the route back is approximately 12 hours.

998
00:59:47.625 --> 00:59:51.965

The Euro port route is more or less the same,

999
00:59:52.285 --> 00:59:54.645
although this year the steaming of the charters vessels,

1000
00:59:54.645 --> 00:59:58.045
as far as I know, has been delayed by 50 minutes due

1001
00:59:58.165 --> 01:00:01.485
to this, uh, new, uh, index of CO two.

1002
01:00:01.945 --> 01:00:05.725
And yeah, if the slow steaming, then that would be better

1003
01:00:05.825 --> 01:00:07.205
for this, uh, index.

1004
01:00:08.545 --> 01:00:11.325
The standalone de class vessels not

1005
01:00:11.325 --> 01:00:12.565
so much comprehend with that.

1006
01:00:12.665 --> 01:00:16.285
And we also have, uh, scrubble, uh, systems on it, uh,

1007
01:00:16.675 --> 01:00:19.005
very sophisticated to, for air pollution

1008
01:00:19.005 --> 01:00:20.125
to, to get out of that.

1009
01:00:20.385 --> 01:00:21.385
So,

1010
01:00:36.565 --> 01:00:41.025
And in terms of, of your schedules, how sensitive are they

1011
01:00:41.285 --> 01:00:44.345
to possible delay, either in terms of arrivals

1012
01:00:44.345 --> 01:00:45.665
or departures at Ingham

1013
01:00:49.245 --> 01:00:50.465
On behalf of ABP?

1014
01:00:50.565 --> 01:00:52.145
Uh, not, not so much.

1015
01:00:52.285 --> 01:00:56.465
We, we can, we leave in the evening time at, uh, 2030

1016
01:00:56.805 --> 01:01:00.945
and if we leave one hour late, we still can make it on time.

1017
01:01:00.945 --> 01:01:02.705
Obviously we have to burn more fuel,

1018
01:01:03.525 --> 01:01:05.145
but you still can make it on time.

1019
01:01:05.565 --> 01:01:09.785
And to my knowledge, the delays that we get is most out

1020
01:01:09.785 --> 01:01:12.385
of the due to weather circumstances

1021
01:01:12.975 --> 01:01:15.305
that you have extensive winds or wave heights

1022
01:01:15.305 --> 01:01:16.505
and you can't run full speed.

1023
01:01:16.505 --> 01:01:18.585
But that will be the same for, for DFDS

1024
01:01:42.505 --> 01:01:46.765
And in, in terms of possible delays, uh,

1025
01:01:46.825 --> 01:01:48.085

either in terms of arriving

1026
01:01:48.105 --> 01:01:51.405
or departing at Ingham, um, what sort

1027
01:01:51.405 --> 01:01:53.885
of period do you think starts to become significant

1028
01:01:54.025 --> 01:01:55.165
for you as, as a company?

1029
01:01:56.225 --> 01:01:58.885
Is it, is, is it over the hour that you just referred to

1030
01:01:58.905 --> 01:01:59.965
or less than an hour?

1031
01:02:00.545 --> 01:02:03.285
Uh, no, uh, we have, uh, strict instructions

1032
01:02:03.285 --> 01:02:07.685
that if our delay is, uh, more than half an hour, we inform,

1033
01:02:07.825 --> 01:02:11.325
uh, CLDN where we come through that we have, uh, this delay.

1034
01:02:11.325 --> 01:02:14.925
Yeah. And if it is more than an hour, yeah, okay, that's it.

1035
01:02:14.925 --> 01:02:17.365
But it's very difficult to, to give incorrect answer there

1036
01:02:17.365 --> 01:02:21.965
because yeah, depends on weather circumstances more than,

1037
01:02:21.985 --> 01:02:24.565
uh, due due to late sailing

1038
01:02:24.905 --> 01:02:29.405
or departures 90, yeah, 99%

1039
01:02:29.405 --> 01:02:31.805
of the time will always sail on time.

1040
01:02:32.275 --> 01:02:36.045
It's hardly, yeah, no, no problem to, to get to, to delay.

1041
01:02:36.715 --> 01:02:38.205
It's more that you have a call

1042
01:02:38.205 --> 01:02:39.605
because we have a company trade

1043
01:02:39.605 --> 01:02:41.565
that we get a driver which calls in says,

1044
01:02:41.585 --> 01:02:43.125
oh listen, I'm 10 minutes late.

1045
01:02:43.785 --> 01:02:45.845
We will wait for that because we still have enough

1046
01:02:45.845 --> 01:02:47.005
time to back up for that.

1047
01:02:47.225 --> 01:02:48.225
So

1048
01:02:51.005 --> 01:02:52.945
You mentioned CLDN there, so

1049
01:02:52.945 --> 01:02:55.745
that is in regard Teal sailings from killing Home.

1050
01:02:56.325 --> 01:02:59.945
Is there a difference between how you manage that?

1051
01:03:00.485 --> 01:03:03.745
Um, let's call it time flexibility, uh,

1052
01:03:04.445 --> 01:03:06.865

for your sellings from the, uh, the, the,

1053
01:03:06.925 --> 01:03:07.945
the Port of Ingham?

1054
01:03:10.935 --> 01:03:13.235
Uh, actually I can't give you an answer to that

1055
01:03:13.235 --> 01:03:16.835
because I seal on Ingham, but only as A-A-P-E-C holder

1056
01:03:16.935 --> 01:03:19.315
and that kinds of delays is up to the masters

1057
01:03:19.455 --> 01:03:20.795
of the chartered vessels.

1058
01:03:20.795 --> 01:03:22.555
I only was on board as PEC holder

1059
01:03:22.655 --> 01:03:24.795
for the Euro report in, uh, in Rotterdam.

1060
01:03:25.055 --> 01:03:26.055
So, okay.

1061
01:03:51.075 --> 01:03:55.105
Could we, um, please, uh, applicant's team have, um, back

1062
01:03:55.105 --> 01:03:59.145
to the recent simulations, we could, we have, um,

1063
01:03:59.415 --> 01:04:03.665
from rep 6 0 3 5 run 15, yeah,

1064
01:04:03.685 --> 01:04:05.065
run 15 shown please.

1065
01:05:32.085 --> 01:05:34.865
So what I

1066
01:05:37.665 --> 01:05:40.985
understand from the report on this simulation is

1067
01:05:40.985 --> 01:05:42.705
that the elapsed time

1068
01:05:42.845 --> 01:05:45.385
for this maneuver was quite substantial.

1069
01:05:46.205 --> 01:05:50.985
Um, is this maneuver going

1070
01:05:51.005 --> 01:05:53.065
to impede access to

1071
01:05:53.205 --> 01:05:55.985
and from the lock, um, to the applicant's team?

1072
01:05:55.985 --> 01:06:00.945
First, um, I suspect that the right person to

1073
01:06:02.405 --> 01:06:04.785
uh, ask is Mr.

1074
01:06:04.895 --> 01:06:09.665
Hann, is he still in the room? No, Mr.

1075
01:06:09.845 --> 01:06:13.905
Mr. Par. Um, would you like to comment first

1076
01:06:13.905 --> 01:06:16.785
and then we'll pass to Harbor Master, uh, Humber,

1077
01:06:17.325 --> 01:06:20.865
is this a maneuver in the way of, um,

1078
01:06:21.125 --> 01:06:22.865
vessel traffic to and from the lock?

1079
01:06:26.245 --> 01:06:28.025

So I think that ans uh, the answer to

1080
01:06:28.025 --> 01:06:29.105
that question is more appropriate

1081
01:06:29.105 --> 01:06:31.345
to come from the Harbor master, but there was a, a lot of,

1082
01:06:31.445 --> 01:06:35.625
uh, conversation during the simulation about the time

1083
01:06:35.925 --> 01:06:38.665
and when, when to consider it starting and stopping.

1084
01:06:38.765 --> 01:06:40.585
So it's definitely not for the whole period

1085
01:06:40.585 --> 01:06:43.065
that you are reviewing on the, on the slide here.

1086
01:06:43.275 --> 01:06:46.025
Understand Harbormaster,

1087
01:06:47.735 --> 01:06:49.345
Yeah, Andrew Furman Harbormaster.

1088
01:06:50.955 --> 01:06:53.465
There, there will be a period of time where, where

1089
01:06:53.465 --> 01:06:56.345
that vessel will earn that space in the river.

1090
01:06:56.725 --> 01:06:58.705
And as, uh, Mr.

1091
01:06:58.845 --> 01:07:00.505
Par mentioned, there was a lot of talk around

1092
01:07:00.505 --> 01:07:01.705
that at the simulations,

1093
01:07:01.705 --> 01:07:04.705
which I think was quite useful speaking to a moving screen.

1094
01:07:05.785 --> 01:07:08.945
'cause there are, there is a part whether

1095
01:07:08.945 --> 01:07:11.025
that vessel was going to the lock, the outer harbor

1096
01:07:11.605 --> 01:07:15.905
or to a new jetty, it does have its own space in the river.

1097
01:07:16.845 --> 01:07:18.385
The fact that that took 30 minutes,

1098
01:07:18.525 --> 01:07:20.745
the whole 30 minutes isn't additional

1099
01:07:21.165 --> 01:07:22.505
to everybody else's time

1100
01:07:22.505 --> 01:07:25.625
because everything is happening concurrently in simple terms

1101
01:07:25.625 --> 01:07:29.865
that the time that you may add on would be from,

1102
01:07:30.135 --> 01:07:33.185
unfortunately the times are not on the, uh, silhouettes,

1103
01:07:33.285 --> 01:07:36.345
but from a space where it leaves its course up the river

1104
01:07:36.965 --> 01:07:39.585
to a space where it's tucked in behind day one

1105
01:07:39.765 --> 01:07:40.905
and East Jetty.

1106
01:07:40.905 --> 01:07:42.825

And there was a few examples talked, um,

1107
01:07:43.005 --> 01:07:45.265
at simulation about would you let 'em out now?

1108
01:07:45.325 --> 01:07:46.625
Yes. Would you let 'em out now?

1109
01:07:46.935 --> 01:07:48.425
Yeah, probably if there's another

1110
01:07:48.425 --> 01:07:49.465
one coming in, you'd be fine.

1111
01:07:49.725 --> 01:07:53.185
So there are quite a few scenarios where

1112
01:07:53.845 --> 01:07:56.105
he has zero impact on all the vessels around it.

1113
01:07:56.365 --> 01:07:58.625
If there was a particular vessel wanting to come out there,

1114
01:07:59.005 --> 01:08:01.345
he would need to wait until that vessel was

1115
01:08:01.855 --> 01:08:04.065
backing down under control before he came out.

1116
01:08:04.205 --> 01:08:08.305
So it's a whole host of different scenarios could crop up

1117
01:08:08.305 --> 01:08:09.625
that would be managed slightly differently,

1118
01:08:09.805 --> 01:08:11.985
but it doesn't, it's not 30 minutes on top

1119
01:08:11.985 --> 01:08:13.105
of 30 minutes every day.

1120
01:08:16.455 --> 01:08:21.325
Thank you. Uh, I

1121
01:08:21.325 --> 01:08:25.405
think what we're trying to get to here is understanding the

1122
01:08:26.105 --> 01:08:30.205
degree of concern that is, uh, is coming forward from, uh,

1123
01:08:30.245 --> 01:08:34.005
stakeholders as to whether the operation

1124
01:08:34.225 --> 01:08:38.885
of the proposed development is likely to create this kind

1125
01:08:38.985 --> 01:08:43.165
of, um, delay on an

1126
01:08:43.925 --> 01:08:45.725
frequent enough occurrence to be

1127
01:08:45.725 --> 01:08:47.325
of concern to their schedules.

1128
01:08:47.685 --> 01:08:50.045
I think probably best to turn to DFDS first

1129
01:08:50.105 --> 01:08:51.125
and see if there's any further.

1130
01:08:51.455 --> 01:08:53.485
Again, same as I asked them earlier on.

1131
01:08:53.545 --> 01:08:55.445
Is there another question that I should have asked there?

1132
01:08:57.405 --> 01:09:00.285
Isabella? Four. Four DFDS.

1133
01:09:00.875 --> 01:09:04.005

Well, so we, I'm not sure

1134
01:09:04.005 --> 01:09:05.925
that the harbor mass can give you this answer

1135
01:09:06.505 --> 01:09:08.325
or anybody can today,

1136
01:09:09.025 --> 01:09:13.725
but what we would like to see is some modeling of, um,

1137
01:09:13.865 --> 01:09:18.765
the likely impacts on the operational congestion

1138
01:09:18.765 --> 01:09:21.565
and potential delays, um, to our operations.

1139
01:09:21.665 --> 01:09:26.445
So we've just heard, I don't mean any disrespect by this,

1140
01:09:26.785 --> 01:09:28.285
but a somewhat off the cuff.

1141
01:09:29.115 --> 01:09:31.405
Well, you know, maybe here they could come in

1142
01:09:31.425 --> 01:09:34.725
and, you know, maybe here we'd have to make them wait, um,

1143
01:09:35.055 --> 01:09:36.405
maybe it would take this long.

1144
01:09:36.825 --> 01:09:40.205
We don't have any actual analysis of that

1145
01:09:40.205 --> 01:09:42.045
that we can consider and interrogate.

1146
01:09:42.185 --> 01:09:46.005
So you've heard our concerns about the stemming, um,

1147
01:09:46.005 --> 01:09:47.005
off the Eastern jetty,

1148
01:09:47.005 --> 01:09:49.045
which wouldn't be possible where this were going on.

1149
01:09:49.425 --> 01:09:51.965
Um, nor would it be possible for movements to go, uh,

1150
01:09:51.965 --> 01:09:53.045
vessels to move into

1151
01:09:53.045 --> 01:09:54.965
or outta the lock while this was going on.

1152
01:09:55.345 --> 01:09:57.525
Um, that would mean if there were a vessel that needed

1153
01:09:57.525 --> 01:09:59.645
to stem, it would have to go to the stem

1154
01:09:59.645 --> 01:10:01.445
of the Western jetty, um,

1155
01:10:01.445 --> 01:10:03.565
which we are concerned would have impacts on arrivals

1156
01:10:03.565 --> 01:10:06.245
and departures from the Immingham outer harbor itself.

1157
01:10:07.705 --> 01:10:10.405
As we've explained, generally these row row vessels are

1158
01:10:10.605 --> 01:10:14.965
arriving within windows, um, which are, well,

1159
01:10:14.965 --> 01:10:17.525
everybody's wanting to arrive and depart in the same windows

1160
01:10:17.525 --> 01:10:19.725

because of the, um, schedules

1161
01:10:19.745 --> 01:10:23.085
and commercial, um, requirements.

1162
01:10:23.225 --> 01:10:27.805
So we, we want to have an understanding

1163
01:10:28.025 --> 01:10:31.325
of these three arrivals, three departures per day together

1164
01:10:31.325 --> 01:10:35.485
with the other, um, baseline traffic and vessel traffic.

1165
01:10:36.035 --> 01:10:37.885
What, what the implications for that would be

1166
01:10:37.885 --> 01:10:39.845
because there are these slots in the lock.

1167
01:10:39.845 --> 01:10:43.725
They're sensitive, they're constrained, it takes, it's,

1168
01:10:44.465 --> 01:10:46.845
you know, there can already be delays even when things are

1169
01:10:46.845 --> 01:10:50.085
running smoothly and, and at current capacity.

1170
01:10:50.585 --> 01:10:52.285
And we, we really feel

1171
01:10:52.285 --> 01:10:54.525
that there should be an assessment far beyond

1172
01:10:54.595 --> 01:10:56.845
that which is contained within chapter 10 of the es,

1173
01:10:56.845 --> 01:11:00.085
which is extremely high level, um,

1174
01:11:00.745 --> 01:11:02.925
to understand the implications answer.

1175
01:11:03.085 --> 01:11:05.925
A another thing I would mention is that in terms

1176
01:11:05.925 --> 01:11:08.205
of the safety piece, um,

1177
01:11:08.265 --> 01:11:11.125
you've heard the Harbor master saying, well, you know,

1178
01:11:11.125 --> 01:11:14.125
we have a range of controls available to us,

1179
01:11:14.225 --> 01:11:17.685
and we will decide, you know, what they will be and,

1180
01:11:17.745 --> 01:11:21.245
and how restrictive they need to be in due course.

1181
01:11:21.785 --> 01:11:23.965
But plainly, the, the nature

1182
01:11:24.065 --> 01:11:28.245
and the relative restrictions imposed by the Harbor master

1183
01:11:28.905 --> 01:11:32.845
may then also have implications for congestion, um,

1184
01:11:32.945 --> 01:11:34.765
and operational smooth running.

1185
01:11:35.305 --> 01:11:39.125
So it's, it's important to us to understand better what,

1186
01:11:39.195 --> 01:11:40.765
what those controls would be,

1187
01:11:41.345 --> 01:11:42.605

not just from a safety perspective,

1188
01:11:42.625 --> 01:11:44.245
but also from an operational perspective

1189
01:11:44.545 --> 01:11:48.805
and see an analysis of likely delays,

1190
01:11:49.665 --> 01:11:52.445
um, caused to, to the DFDS operations.

1191
01:12:03.295 --> 01:12:04.885
First, I'm just going to ask

1192
01:12:04.885 --> 01:12:07.525
before passing to the applicant to see whether Hub,

1193
01:12:07.525 --> 01:12:10.325
master Pumper would like to respond on that.

1194
01:12:12.105 --> 01:12:15.925
And then I think we, if I, I'll leave it to Mr.

1195
01:12:16.105 --> 01:12:18.685
STR to decide who should respond. Could, could,

1196
01:12:19.015 --> 01:12:21.645
Could I have an opportunity at same moment Dr. Rogers will

1197
01:12:21.645 --> 01:12:22.925
want to say something as well briefly,

1198
01:12:23.705 --> 01:12:24.705
Mr. str be fine. Uh,

1199
01:12:24.705 --> 01:12:25.765
in

1200
01:12:25.765 --> 01:12:29.445
that case I'll give Hama Hamer a few more minutes to, to, to

1201
01:12:30.165 --> 01:12:31.885
consider, but ask your question now

1202
01:12:31.905 --> 01:12:33.285
and then we'll pass to Hamo.

1203
01:12:34.345 --> 01:12:36.525
We, we just want to raise a short point in relation

1204
01:12:36.545 --> 01:12:38.645
to impact on tanker arrivals.

1205
01:12:47.275 --> 01:12:50.355
Ed Rogers for I ot, we'd just like to point out

1206
01:12:50.355 --> 01:12:52.595
that a finger peer is an incredibly important aspect

1207
01:12:52.595 --> 01:12:53.835
of IOT operations

1208
01:12:54.135 --> 01:12:58.435
and, uh, whereas o uh, operations, uh,

1209
01:12:58.665 --> 01:13:02.475
into the lock and further upstream, um, may be concurrent

1210
01:13:02.495 --> 01:13:05.355
or could be concurrent with the higher vessels arrivals

1211
01:13:05.355 --> 01:13:08.075
of departures, this is likely not to be the case for the,

1212
01:13:08.095 --> 01:13:09.595
uh, finger pair operations itself.

1213
01:13:10.715 --> 01:13:14.515
I think an understanding of where TOWAGE is required, uh,

1214
01:13:14.735 --> 01:13:18.035

for IA vessel arrivals and or departures, whether

1215
01:13:18.615 --> 01:13:21.795
and how, uh, consecutive arrivals could occur.

1216
01:13:21.855 --> 01:13:25.195
So what would be the total period of time at which the, uh,

1217
01:13:25.335 --> 01:13:27.275
the arrival of the finger pair would be impacted

1218
01:13:27.295 --> 01:13:29.795
by the IA development would be incredibly useful

1219
01:13:29.895 --> 01:13:31.915
to the operators.

1220
01:13:36.385 --> 01:13:39.895
Thank you. I'm just going

1221
01:13:39.895 --> 01:13:41.935
to look at CLDN just in case the,

1222
01:13:42.585 --> 01:13:44.255
you'd like an opportunity to speak here.

1223
01:13:48.805 --> 01:13:51.225
Uh, Robbie Owen for CLDN, um, just briefly,

1224
01:13:51.605 --> 01:13:55.545
so on this agenda item, um, it, it, it's really to do

1225
01:13:55.545 --> 01:13:59.865
with concern about the, uh, uh, possible congestion

1226
01:13:59.865 --> 01:14:01.745
during the construction period, uhhuh.

1227
01:14:01.825 --> 01:14:06.265
Um, uh, and uh, I mentioned earlier, uh,

1228
01:14:06.325 --> 01:14:10.465
on a previous agenda item, the issue

1229
01:14:10.465 --> 01:14:11.485
of protective provisions

1230
01:14:11.625 --> 01:14:15.525
and that, um, we put forward, um, at deadline for

1231
01:14:16.545 --> 01:14:19.845
on the 9th of October, CDNs

1232
01:14:21.195 --> 01:14:23.205
preferred form of protective provisions

1233
01:14:23.205 --> 01:14:26.085
to which we are awaiting the applicant's response

1234
01:14:26.385 --> 01:14:30.765
and those protective provisions, which were in appendix two

1235
01:14:32.065 --> 01:14:36.805
to our rep 4 0 18 document.

1236
01:14:38.515 --> 01:14:41.925
They do include a number of provisions in relation to, uh,

1237
01:14:42.465 --> 01:14:45.125
uh, that there are essentially four paragraphs,

1238
01:14:45.125 --> 01:14:47.645
paragraphs 4, 5, 6,

1239
01:14:47.745 --> 01:14:50.965
and seven, uh, under the heading notice of

1240
01:14:51.185 --> 01:14:54.965
and consultation on works and vessel movements.

1241
01:14:55.185 --> 01:14:58.685

And these are intended to give a degree of protection

1242
01:14:58.685 --> 01:15:01.765
to CLDN, um, during the construction period.

1243
01:15:01.925 --> 01:15:06.365
I think Mr. I've, Seymour is happy just to say a few words

1244
01:15:06.425 --> 01:15:09.125
to underline the thinking behind asking

1245
01:15:09.145 --> 01:15:11.365
for those protective visions and the, and, and,

1246
01:15:11.705 --> 01:15:12.925
and the protection they would afford.

1247
01:15:13.085 --> 01:15:14.085
CLDN.

1248
01:15:18.805 --> 01:15:21.835
Thank you sir. OV Seymour for CLDN.

1249
01:15:22.215 --> 01:15:24.995
Um, I'll just touch only really principle on the,

1250
01:15:24.995 --> 01:15:26.075
the other points made

1251
01:15:26.095 --> 01:15:29.475
by colleagues at DFDS at the state about the nature

1252
01:15:29.855 --> 01:15:31.995
of our services on the Humber.

1253
01:15:32.455 --> 01:15:36.595
Uh, currently we have, uh, also two services, uh,

1254
01:15:36.995 --> 01:15:38.195
arriving in the morning, uh,

1255
01:15:38.195 --> 01:15:40.795
and departing the evening, one between killing home

1256
01:15:40.935 --> 01:15:42.435
and Brook and Belgium

1257
01:15:42.895 --> 01:15:45.555
and the other between killing him and Rotterdam.

1258
01:15:46.175 --> 01:15:48.195
Um, those services roughly.

1259
01:15:48.495 --> 01:15:52.235
So, and I took general terms at 12, a 12 round turn

1260
01:15:52.415 --> 01:15:54.315
around 12 out turnaround time.

1261
01:15:54.415 --> 01:15:58.915
So, uh, you know, they arrive overnight, uh, uh,

1262
01:15:59.275 --> 01:16:01.555
discharged during the day and then leave in the evening

1263
01:16:02.695 --> 01:16:04.955
whilst there is, um, some

1264
01:16:05.605 --> 01:16:07.555
space in the, the sailing schedule.

1265
01:16:08.335 --> 01:16:12.115
Uh, the reason we looked for those protective provisions

1266
01:16:12.615 --> 01:16:15.675
and have obtained them on other schemes is

1267
01:16:15.675 --> 01:16:17.155
because the efficiency

1268
01:16:17.155 --> 01:16:19.595

of our services relies on our schedule.

1269
01:16:19.815 --> 01:16:23.635
We are operating scheduled, uh, railroad ferry services.

1270
01:16:24.295 --> 01:16:28.955
Uh, and so any interruptions to, uh, the, the sailing up,

1271
01:16:28.955 --> 01:16:32.675
the Humber from construction, barge vessels

1272
01:16:32.675 --> 01:16:34.995
or other such movements would impact

1273
01:16:35.055 --> 01:16:38.715
or has a potential to impact on those schedules.

1274
01:16:39.135 --> 01:16:43.595
Uh, and late arrival at the um, the terminal.

1275
01:16:43.835 --> 01:16:47.315
A killing home will impact on the time available

1276
01:16:47.495 --> 01:16:49.555
for unloading, unloading the vessel

1277
01:16:50.055 --> 01:16:53.475
and ensuring, you know, a timely departure in the evening.

1278
01:16:53.715 --> 01:16:56.875
Likewise, uh, failing to leave on time

1279
01:16:57.415 --> 01:17:00.595
or within a reasonable time means, um, uh,

1280
01:17:00.645 --> 01:17:02.395
knock on effects are in the,

1281
01:17:02.495 --> 01:17:04.555
the continental terminals in Sabal

1282
01:17:04.555 --> 01:17:06.715
or Notter, Damm, which also occupy,

1283
01:17:06.715 --> 01:17:08.075
those are our hub terminals.

1284
01:17:08.335 --> 01:17:10.685
So they serve our network, uh,

1285
01:17:10.865 --> 01:17:13.685
and well say substantially sized terminals.

1286
01:17:14.065 --> 01:17:17.925
Uh, they handle, um, multiple vessel services every day.

1287
01:17:18.025 --> 01:17:21.685
So it's a tightly, uh, time to operation

1288
01:17:21.785 --> 01:17:23.725
to maximize efficiency, uh,

1289
01:17:23.725 --> 01:17:26.805
and also minimize downtime at terminals waiting for

1290
01:17:27.435 --> 01:17:28.885
vessels to arrive or leave.

1291
01:17:29.625 --> 01:17:33.005
Um, the other point, which been made by both STAIN

1292
01:17:33.005 --> 01:17:37.285
and DFCS is, uh, the, uh, lower saing, lower

1293
01:17:37.345 --> 01:17:38.685
or slower saing speeds.

1294
01:17:38.685 --> 01:17:41.445
We operate, uh, to burn less fuel.

1295
01:17:41.905 --> 01:17:44.765

Uh, and that, uh, shouldn't be underestimated

1296
01:17:44.825 --> 01:17:46.565
as being quite critical.

1297
01:17:46.795 --> 01:17:48.285
It's important, uh,

1298
01:17:48.285 --> 01:17:50.445
it is something we consider is fundamental

1299
01:17:50.785 --> 01:17:52.885
to being a responsible operator,

1300
01:17:53.265 --> 01:17:56.685
and we have always operated for some substantial time,

1301
01:17:56.995 --> 01:17:59.925
much lower sailing speeds than our competitors.

1302
01:18:00.145 --> 01:18:04.965
So the impacts, whilst of course there are times, uh,

1303
01:18:04.965 --> 01:18:06.605
because of weather or other incident

1304
01:18:06.635 --> 01:18:09.765
that mean there are delays, we look typically

1305
01:18:09.765 --> 01:18:11.805
to minimize those and certainly

1306
01:18:11.805 --> 01:18:15.085
where things are un are potentially avoidable in terms

1307
01:18:15.085 --> 01:18:16.965
of other marine traffic for,

1308
01:18:16.985 --> 01:18:19.925
for construction project like this, uh, that we would look

1309
01:18:19.925 --> 01:18:23.205
to ensure that we don't suffer the consequences of

1310
01:18:23.205 --> 01:18:25.965
that on our scheduled operations.

1311
01:18:26.665 --> 01:18:27.885
Uh, thank you.

1312
01:18:31.545 --> 01:18:36.535
Thank you. Mr. So firstly to Berma, uh,

1313
01:18:39.415 --> 01:18:41.855
I think it's just, I'll leave it to an open response.

1314
01:18:42.155 --> 01:18:45.535
Uh, how would you comment on those points in turn

1315
01:18:45.535 --> 01:18:46.615
from the three ips?

1316
01:18:51.475 --> 01:18:53.535
Andrew Ferman have a master Humber,

1317
01:18:54.435 --> 01:18:58.655
and just on the point of congestion, really of each, to me,

1318
01:18:58.765 --> 01:19:02.455
each customer, each stakeholder has a, has a requirement

1319
01:19:03.025 --> 01:19:04.175
right across the Humber,

1320
01:19:04.315 --> 01:19:05.615
and I see it as my role

1321
01:19:06.675 --> 01:19:08.655
to facilitate all of those movements.

1322
01:19:09.395 --> 01:19:12.775

Um, so for me, I'm presented with a new

1323
01:19:13.885 --> 01:19:16.655
challenge, new customer, we'll facilitate those movements.

1324
01:19:17.075 --> 01:19:21.015
It, of course that will have potentially an impact on

1325
01:19:21.585 --> 01:19:23.375
other operational flexibility,

1326
01:19:23.915 --> 01:19:26.775
but is all well within, uh, the amount

1327
01:19:26.775 --> 01:19:28.495
of movements we've done at Ingham before.

1328
01:19:29.275 --> 01:19:33.375
And I believe well within our capability to,

1329
01:19:33.375 --> 01:19:34.375
to manage going forward.

1330
01:19:34.955 --> 01:19:38.615
Um, and whether that means the stent vessels themselves have

1331
01:19:38.615 --> 01:19:41.015
to be spread out further, uh,

1332
01:19:41.075 --> 01:19:43.415
Dr. Rogers mentioned an iot finger, peer vessel.

1333
01:19:43.775 --> 01:19:48.415
I would see that as, I'll use the word taking precedent,

1334
01:19:48.415 --> 01:19:51.255
but yeah, as that would birth and,

1335
01:19:51.355 --> 01:19:54.615
and the other vessels would fit in around, um, it's not

1336
01:19:55.815 --> 01:19:59.015
stenner comes in, everybody fits around that I see as being,

1337
01:19:59.075 --> 01:20:00.895
as being capable of bringing them in,

1338
01:20:00.975 --> 01:20:04.575
facilitating another service, another customer, um,

1339
01:20:05.485 --> 01:20:08.085
another, another part user to the SGE.

1340
01:20:09.145 --> 01:20:12.125
And I think that that's our, you know, I see that as my role

1341
01:20:12.915 --> 01:20:14.885
done safely and, and properly managed.

1342
01:20:17.935 --> 01:20:20.925
Thank you. And, and so the specific point about, uh,

1343
01:20:21.445 --> 01:20:23.925
construction, uh, phase or construction

1344
01:20:24.225 --> 01:20:25.965
and, uh, operational overlap.

1345
01:20:27.905 --> 01:20:31.685
Do you have experience to fall back on which will

1346
01:20:31.865 --> 01:20:34.685
and help to plan, uh,

1347
01:20:35.185 --> 01:20:39.405
and in liaison with obviously the, uh, the, the,

1348
01:20:39.505 --> 01:20:42.965
the construction team, a minimization of

1349
01:20:43.505 --> 01:20:46.365

effect on, uh, uh, uh, scheduled services?

1350
01:20:47.685 --> 01:20:50.525
Y yes, I would extend that to a minimization of effect on,

1351
01:20:50.545 --> 01:20:53.925
on the whole estuary, including my own pilotage team,

1352
01:20:54.265 --> 01:20:56.045
my VTS team, et cetera.

1353
01:20:56.105 --> 01:21:00.565
So, um, the con a construction

1354
01:21:00.565 --> 01:21:01.965
or a project will normally come forward.

1355
01:21:02.535 --> 01:21:05.645
It'll have some great ideas of how that's going to be done.

1356
01:21:06.345 --> 01:21:10.285
Um, and we'll, we'll test that for, for practicability

1357
01:21:10.585 --> 01:21:14.005
and safety, and we, we will impose measures

1358
01:21:14.005 --> 01:21:16.245
that make sure it has the minimum effect, um,

1359
01:21:16.675 --> 01:21:20.285
from a safety perspective, from a environmental perspective

1360
01:21:20.305 --> 01:21:21.925
and, and from a commercial perspective.

1361
01:21:22.625 --> 01:21:26.485
Um, obviously, well, depending everything, normally,

1362
01:21:26.485 --> 01:21:28.965
if the project has the right to go ahead, then it,

1363
01:21:28.965 --> 01:21:30.165
then it must be facilitated.

1364
01:21:30.425 --> 01:21:32.125
But that has to be done hand in hand with,

1365
01:21:32.125 --> 01:21:33.405
with the existing estuary.

1366
01:21:36.175 --> 01:21:39.205
Thank you, captain Ben, Mr. Strong,

1367
01:21:39.995 --> 01:21:41.245
your opportunity to respond.

1368
01:21:42.135 --> 01:21:45.365
Thank you, sir. Um, I think Commander Bristow may be able

1369
01:21:45.365 --> 01:21:48.765
to assist you on some aspects of congestion

1370
01:21:48.765 --> 01:21:52.725
because of his experience of, uh, on the Humber and the VTS,

1371
01:21:53.305 --> 01:21:54.925
and, uh, I might just add something at the end,

1372
01:21:58.465 --> 01:21:59.465
Sir. Paul Bristow

1373
01:21:59.465 --> 01:22:01.645
for ABP, um, I think it,

1374
01:22:01.705 --> 01:22:04.085
it would probably be most helpful rather than looking at

1375
01:22:04.085 --> 01:22:05.965
each individual component that's been raised.

1376
01:22:05.965 --> 01:22:09.645

Just to step back and, and look in the round a little bit.

1377
01:22:10.225 --> 01:22:13.805
Um, you'll be aware in the A—B—P—N—R—A

1378
01:22:14.315 --> 01:22:16.845
chapter five, we talk about

1379
01:22:17.585 --> 01:22:19.965
the global trend of shipping.

1380
01:22:20.065 --> 01:22:23.765
And we, this is entirely reflected in the Humber,

1381
01:22:24.495 --> 01:22:27.285
where we're seeing vessels increasing in size

1382
01:22:28.435 --> 01:22:30.325
with similar tonnages being moved,

1383
01:22:30.355 --> 01:22:32.165
therefore there are less port calls.

1384
01:22:32.465 --> 01:22:33.685
And that is a global trend

1385
01:22:34.105 --> 01:22:37.045
and a trend that's reflected, uh, in Ingham.

1386
01:22:37.545 --> 01:22:39.485
We also, in that same document go on just

1387
01:22:39.485 --> 01:22:40.965
to talk about the future baselines.

1388
01:22:40.965 --> 01:22:42.685
These are predictions, um,

1389
01:22:43.305 --> 01:22:45.805
but uh, they talk about, um, growth

1390
01:22:46.025 --> 01:22:49.405
and continue continuation of those trends.

1391
01:22:50.745 --> 01:22:54.605
Um, I won't steal his work in case you wish

1392
01:22:54.605 --> 01:22:56.685
to examine Harbor Master hu a little more,

1393
01:22:56.705 --> 01:23:01.485
but he did produce a table in his responses to EX two,

1394
01:23:02.215 --> 01:23:03.525
which clearly shows

1395
01:23:04.155 --> 01:23:06.805
that there is capacity both on the Humber

1396
01:23:07.465 --> 01:23:11.485
and in the port of Ingham itself, uh, in terms

1397
01:23:11.545 --> 01:23:16.045
of the average, uh, daily arrivals and also the peaks.

1398
01:23:16.225 --> 01:23:18.125
So those maximums, uh,

1399
01:23:18.125 --> 01:23:19.965
that have historically been dealt with.

1400
01:23:22.105 --> 01:23:25.685
So the capacity is there, um,

1401
01:23:26.585 --> 01:23:29.645
you'll recall from your AC company visit, um,

1402
01:23:29.985 --> 01:23:33.165
the pilot operations manager who hosted you and, uh,

1403
01:23:33.265 --> 01:23:35.005

and the various other interested parties

1404
01:23:35.705 --> 01:23:37.565
in the Ingham Marine control center.

1405
01:23:38.245 --> 01:23:41.405
I understand they showed you, uh, the chart

1406
01:23:41.585 --> 01:23:44.445
of the approaches and the various stemming positions.

1407
01:23:45.345 --> 01:23:48.605
And, um, of course, we're aware of

1408
01:23:48.865 --> 01:23:52.845
how long indicative timings to maneuver from each

1409
01:23:52.845 --> 01:23:54.205
of those stemming positions,

1410
01:23:54.305 --> 01:23:58.125
either back onto the Immingham railroad terminal in due

1411
01:23:58.125 --> 01:23:59.925
course onto the eastern

1412
01:23:59.925 --> 01:24:02.245
or western jetty into the outer harbor,

1413
01:24:02.785 --> 01:24:05.765
or of course, from the bellm mouth into the lock.

1414
01:24:08.465 --> 01:24:11.445
So we, we, we understand this, we know how long this takes,

1415
01:24:11.585 --> 01:24:13.125
and we know where vessels wait

1416
01:24:13.345 --> 01:24:15.125
and we know how long it takes them to get

1417
01:24:15.125 --> 01:24:19.005
to their destination hub asked, Humbard just talked about,

1418
01:24:19.665 --> 01:24:22.925
uh, that even in the, this somewhat extreme example

1419
01:24:22.945 --> 01:24:26.165
of a 30 minute maneuver, uh, that

1420
01:24:26.745 --> 01:24:31.725
it isn't a full 30 minutes incremental that is added to the,

1421
01:24:31.865 --> 01:24:35.325
the time that's taken, the vessel owns its space

1422
01:24:35.825 --> 01:24:37.365
as he described for that period,

1423
01:24:37.705 --> 01:24:39.165
it then maneuvers outta the way

1424
01:24:39.385 --> 01:24:41.925
and we're able to permit the next vessel

1425
01:24:42.105 --> 01:24:43.245
to start its maneuver.

1426
01:24:45.185 --> 01:24:47.285
And so I'd like to just touch on how do we manage

1427
01:24:47.285 --> 01:24:48.765
that safely, because that's,

1428
01:24:48.765 --> 01:24:50.965
that's not an insignificant thing for us to manage.

1429
01:24:51.665 --> 01:24:52.885
Um, well, we have a team of

1430
01:24:53.795 --> 01:24:58.125

5 24 7 watch keepers in the Ingham Marine control center.

1431
01:24:58.305 --> 01:25:00.565
You, you also saw them on your previous

1432
01:25:00.565 --> 01:25:02.445
visit in the back office.

1433
01:25:02.625 --> 01:25:05.845
We have two schedulers 24 7.

1434
01:25:05.935 --> 01:25:09.085
Their job is to manage the movements of all

1435
01:25:09.085 --> 01:25:11.125
of the vessels across the Humber

1436
01:25:11.425 --> 01:25:13.525
and all of the vessels, uh, entering

1437
01:25:13.585 --> 01:25:15.725
and departing from our four ports.

1438
01:25:16.105 --> 01:25:19.565
So we build a robust plan, uh,

1439
01:25:19.745 --> 01:25:22.045
and we allocate the necessary pilots

1440
01:25:22.065 --> 01:25:25.885
or confirm that we have pecks, uh, who can then, uh,

1441
01:25:25.995 --> 01:25:28.245
take those vessels and follow that plan.

1442
01:25:28.945 --> 01:25:30.725
Excuse me, just a a point, you, you,

1443
01:25:30.745 --> 01:25:32.765
you said they make control center,

1444
01:25:32.825 --> 01:25:34.165
did you mean the, the Grimsby,

1445
01:25:34.295 --> 01:25:35.925
Sorry, the Humber Marine Control Center.

1446
01:25:35.925 --> 01:25:38.565
Yeah, the, um,

1447
01:25:40.485 --> 01:25:42.885
subsequently, so that's the plan.

1448
01:25:42.965 --> 01:25:47.885
A robust plan is constructed pilot's ps to, uh,

1449
01:25:47.905 --> 01:25:50.485
to, to, to, um, sail the sail

1450
01:25:50.505 --> 01:25:52.725
or the arrival of the, of the vessel.

1451
01:25:53.665 --> 01:25:54.845
We then have, um,

1452
01:25:55.645 --> 01:25:59.205
a highly trained team in the vessel traffic service, uh,

1453
01:25:59.305 --> 01:26:01.805
two vessel traffic, uh, service officers

1454
01:26:01.865 --> 01:26:03.605
and one assistant harbor master.

1455
01:26:04.945 --> 01:26:08.405
The plan is there, it's robust, but it's dynamic as well.

1456
01:26:08.505 --> 01:26:12.085
And it's the job of these three individuals using the

1457
01:26:12.085 --> 01:26:13.805

technology that they have at their disposal,

1458
01:26:14.025 --> 01:26:16.205
all the communications that they have at their disposal,

1459
01:26:16.985 --> 01:26:21.365
and their extensive experience of operations on the Humber

1460
01:26:21.825 --> 01:26:24.365
to ensure that that plan is then flexed

1461
01:26:24.465 --> 01:26:26.445
and tweaked to make it first

1462
01:26:26.465 --> 01:26:30.045
and foremost safe, which is their ultimate accountability

1463
01:26:30.705 --> 01:26:35.445
and secondly, efficient to permit the smooth running of,

1464
01:26:35.505 --> 01:26:36.605
of the commercial port.

1465
01:26:37.345 --> 01:26:41.445
So I just wanted to give you a flavor there, sir, of how we,

1466
01:26:41.945 --> 01:26:44.445
um, we, we do understand exactly

1467
01:26:44.445 --> 01:26:46.165
what the issues are being raised are.

1468
01:26:46.585 --> 01:26:48.685
We have a robust means of managing

1469
01:26:49.305 --> 01:26:52.045
and, uh, mitigating, uh, those issues.

1470
01:26:52.385 --> 01:26:55.125
And we have spare capacity on the port for growth.

1471
01:26:57.065 --> 01:26:59.405
You did touch, there was one point that I'd just like to,

1472
01:26:59.425 --> 01:27:01.445
um, to conclude on before I hand back to Mr.

1473
01:27:01.585 --> 01:27:05.125
Strand is, um, the matter of construction.

1474
01:27:05.995 --> 01:27:09.045
Well, um, as recently as the beginning of this year,

1475
01:27:09.545 --> 01:27:12.445
we were conducting, uh, a maintenance dredge

1476
01:27:12.445 --> 01:27:13.725
of a three kilometer channel

1477
01:27:14.305 --> 01:27:18.605
and a the Grimsby River terminal facility, uh,

1478
01:27:18.615 --> 01:27:20.845
which is in Grimsby, you would've seen

1479
01:27:20.845 --> 01:27:22.245
that looking outta the window

1480
01:27:22.625 --> 01:27:26.125
of the Humber Marine Control Center down there in Grimsby.

1481
01:27:27.145 --> 01:27:31.565
Um, we had at various stages, two backhoe dredges.

1482
01:27:31.565 --> 01:27:34.885
They're essentially a platform with a digger on it, uh,

1483
01:27:34.885 --> 01:27:38.285
with spud legs as described, um, earlier as well.

1484
01:27:39.555 --> 01:27:41.445

They were being maneuvered by two tugs,

1485
01:27:41.865 --> 01:27:45.485
and we had up to four split barges being maneuvered by up

1486
01:27:45.485 --> 01:27:49.565
to three tugs, taking the spoils out to the dredge ground.

1487
01:27:50.825 --> 01:27:54.725
The very same team that I've just described were managing

1488
01:27:54.725 --> 01:27:58.125
that efficiently, minimizing the impact on, um,

1489
01:27:58.345 --> 01:28:01.485
on our customers, mini, mini, minimizing the, uh,

1490
01:28:01.585 --> 01:28:02.885
impact on operations,

1491
01:28:03.025 --> 01:28:06.885
and most importantly absolutely ensuring the safe

1492
01:28:06.885 --> 01:28:08.645
operation, uh, throughout.

1493
01:28:08.945 --> 01:28:11.645
So we've got a very contemporary example of

1494
01:28:11.645 --> 01:28:13.205
where we've managed, um,

1495
01:28:13.605 --> 01:28:16.845
a relatively complex construction style.

1496
01:28:17.395 --> 01:28:19.925
This, in this instance, dredging, uh,

1497
01:28:19.995 --> 01:28:22.005
just in the adjacent port of Grimsby.

1498
01:28:22.025 --> 01:28:25.005
And it's the same people who would be, uh, be managing that.

1499
01:28:28.295 --> 01:28:29.295
Thank you, sir.

1500
01:28:31.475 --> 01:28:32.645
Very thank

1501
01:28:32.645 --> 01:28:33.645
You comm. Um,

1502
01:28:33.645 --> 01:28:36.965
no questions at this time to Mr. str.

1503
01:28:37.465 --> 01:28:41.965
So J James TRO for the applicant, just to say the chapter

1504
01:28:42.755 --> 01:28:46.285
16 of the environmental statement considers

1505
01:28:47.455 --> 01:28:51.245
congestion and whether there would be any impact

1506
01:28:52.345 --> 01:28:56.125
on services in light of those sorts of controls.

1507
01:28:56.675 --> 01:28:59.765
Commander Bristow has just been identifying the management

1508
01:28:59.785 --> 01:29:03.165
of services, the prioritization of say,

1509
01:29:03.165 --> 01:29:05.125
commercial vehicle vessels.

1510
01:29:05.205 --> 01:29:08.645
I keep on saying vehicle vessels over construction vessels,

1511
01:29:08.945 --> 01:29:13.845

and it's, it's in the, the environmental statement.

1512
01:29:13.905 --> 01:29:15.925
I'm not sure we've had any comments on it,

1513
01:29:15.925 --> 01:29:17.445
but there may have been, uh,

1514
01:29:18.895 --> 01:29:20.165
there, there, there're various bits.

1515
01:29:20.185 --> 01:29:24.005
I'm, I'm looking at 16.8 point 33 on onwards.

1516
01:29:26.065 --> 01:29:28.045
It starts a bit earlier, actually, I apologize.

1517
01:29:28.385 --> 01:29:32.205
Yes, 16.8 point 28 effects on existing businesses

1518
01:29:33.225 --> 01:29:35.845
and activities, uh, during construction.

1519
01:29:35.945 --> 01:29:38.365
And then there's some commentary about construction

1520
01:29:39.105 --> 01:29:41.965
indeed operation at 16.8 0.36.

1521
01:29:43.825 --> 01:29:45.645
So, um, I noted

1522
01:29:46.075 --> 01:29:50.805
that the D-F-D-S-I think request was for

1523
01:29:51.865 --> 01:29:55.805
timing of movements in the Humber Master Harbor Master's

1524
01:29:55.805 --> 01:29:59.245
opinion as to when that's interacting with the lock, maybe

1525
01:29:59.245 --> 01:30:02.125
that can be provided from the examples.

1526
01:30:02.865 --> 01:30:05.005
And I think I did request

1527
01:30:05.005 --> 01:30:07.365
before on the last occasion, I'm told I didn't, I thought

1528
01:30:07.365 --> 01:30:11.765
that, but we asked the FDS to provide their simulations

1529
01:30:11.765 --> 01:30:13.125
of going into the Al Harbor

1530
01:30:13.905 --> 01:30:17.045
and if they could provide those as I requested last time,

1531
01:30:17.285 --> 01:30:19.085
'cause we thought it'd be helpful to you to see that

1532
01:30:19.595 --> 01:30:23.805
that will show how long they're interacting, um, potentially

1533
01:30:23.805 --> 01:30:25.205
with our vessels or indeed the lock.

1534
01:30:30.035 --> 01:30:30.455
Stefan,

1535
01:30:30.535 --> 01:30:34.735
Isabella, for the, for DFDS, um, so

1536
01:30:35.335 --> 01:30:36.495
I referred, I'd just like

1537
01:30:36.495 --> 01:30:38.895
to correct an error I made when I referred to chapter 10,

1538
01:30:38.955 --> 01:30:40.375

in which I said the analysis

1539
01:30:40.875 --> 01:30:44.055
of congestion was very high level and wanting,

1540
01:30:44.235 --> 01:30:46.055
and I meant to refer to chapter 16,

1541
01:30:46.055 --> 01:30:47.615
which is the one you've just been taken to.

1542
01:30:48.115 --> 01:30:50.295
And could I just mention, sir, that, um,

1543
01:30:50.295 --> 01:30:53.615
commander Bristow has just set out a very

1544
01:30:54.165 --> 01:30:57.455
helpful explanation as to all the information

1545
01:30:57.455 --> 01:30:58.975
that they have at their fingertips.

1546
01:30:59.605 --> 01:31:04.095
They have, um, a plan, they have 5 24 hour watch keepers,

1547
01:31:04.715 --> 01:31:08.775
two schedulers and three individuals who, um, use the plan

1548
01:31:08.775 --> 01:31:10.095
and their extensive experience

1549
01:31:10.555 --> 01:31:14.215
to ensure the efficient movement, um, running

1550
01:31:14.215 --> 01:31:15.295
of the commercial port.

1551
01:31:15.795 --> 01:31:17.775
And they know, um, between them

1552
01:31:17.795 --> 01:31:22.255
and their experience where vessels wait, how long they wait

1553
01:31:22.255 --> 01:31:24.455
and how long it takes to get to their destination.

1554
01:31:25.035 --> 01:31:26.775
Now we don't see any of

1555
01:31:26.775 --> 01:31:29.335
that information reflected in chapter 16.

1556
01:31:30.045 --> 01:31:32.815
That is the very sort of information that we've been asking

1557
01:31:32.955 --> 01:31:34.375
for to, to try

1558
01:31:34.375 --> 01:31:37.615
to understand the potential commercial impacts

1559
01:31:38.195 --> 01:31:40.935
on our operations, which we hoped we might be able

1560
01:31:40.935 --> 01:31:43.015
to discuss in the commercial workshop that was canceled,

1561
01:31:43.915 --> 01:31:45.175
um, unilaterally.

1562
01:31:45.755 --> 01:31:48.175
Um, and it appears there is that information available.

1563
01:31:48.755 --> 01:31:52.375
So we would like, um, to have more,

1564
01:31:52.435 --> 01:31:54.615
and I'll leave it to you to look again at the parts

1565
01:31:54.615 --> 01:31:55.735

of chapter 16 that Mr.

1566
01:31:55.965 --> 01:32:00.725
STRs referred you to and to, um, we hope conclude that

1567
01:32:00.725 --> 01:32:03.325
that doesn't provide any real analysis of the sort

1568
01:32:03.325 --> 01:32:04.965
that we need to properly understand the

1569
01:32:04.965 --> 01:32:06.445
implications on our operations.

1570
01:32:08.335 --> 01:32:12.565
Thank you. Uh, and earlier the, the, the point really was

1571
01:32:13.395 --> 01:32:17.565
because of the, uh, essentially the

1572
01:32:20.115 --> 01:32:24.485
Real importance of the twice daily scheduled services,

1573
01:32:25.425 --> 01:32:30.365
um, tending to operate within a fairly tight window

1574
01:32:30.545 --> 01:32:35.245
of, of, of time, uh, that seems

1575
01:32:35.245 --> 01:32:37.525
to indicate a need for a,

1576
01:32:39.465 --> 01:32:43.005
rather than a meta-analysis of, of con congestion

1577
01:32:43.025 --> 01:32:44.965
as portrayed in chapter 16.

1578
01:32:45.085 --> 01:32:48.165
A, a more micro analysis of those windows.

1579
01:32:49.545 --> 01:32:53.605
Um, would the applicant, um, be willing

1580
01:32:53.665 --> 01:32:57.445
and able to produce by deadline seven, some further work on

1581
01:32:57.445 --> 01:33:01.245
that, which would address the point in particular the DFDS

1582
01:33:01.245 --> 01:33:04.445
point, but that's obviously, uh, of, of some commonality

1583
01:33:04.665 --> 01:33:06.085
to the other ipss as well.

1584
01:33:07.485 --> 01:33:11.245
I think possibly the, I would say that the, uh, that the,

1585
01:33:11.425 --> 01:33:15.285
the coastal tanker, um, issue

1586
01:33:15.285 --> 01:33:18.085
that was raised earlier on was answered

1587
01:33:18.185 --> 01:33:20.605
by Harbor Master Humber, uh,

1588
01:33:20.945 --> 01:33:24.285
and seems to me to be a separate issue

1589
01:33:24.385 --> 01:33:26.725
to the congestion of scheduled services.

1590
01:33:26.905 --> 01:33:29.005
Am I right in that assumption? That's the first question.

1591
01:33:29.185 --> 01:33:31.445
Uh, before we come back to the applicant,

1592
01:33:35.725 --> 01:33:38.205

Ed Rogers for iot, yes, you are

1593
01:33:38.205 --> 01:33:39.205
Correct. Thank you.

1594
01:33:39.205 --> 01:33:43.445
So to the applicant, you've had a moment to,

1595
01:33:44.345 --> 01:33:46.405
uh, uh, have a chat amongst yourselves.

1596
01:33:46.525 --> 01:33:49.085
I I, I wonder whether you'd like to consider that overnight

1597
01:33:49.225 --> 01:33:50.805
and, uh, we'll talk about it in the morning.

1598
01:33:51.595 --> 01:33:52.595
Certainly. So

1599
01:33:56.075 --> 01:33:57.845
Just building on that point, I think it,

1600
01:33:58.345 --> 01:34:03.285
it sounds like some sort of typical day type,

1601
01:34:03.545 --> 01:34:06.845
um, I don't know, plot

1602
01:34:07.185 --> 01:34:10.765
or something graphic that that shows what's coming in,

1603
01:34:10.765 --> 01:34:14.085
what's going out, how it all relates to one another,

1604
01:34:14.725 --> 01:34:17.565
probably as things stand today versus

1605
01:34:17.865 --> 01:34:20.205
how things might be if there were three new

1606
01:34:20.345 --> 01:34:22.965
births would assist.

1607
01:34:23.385 --> 01:34:25.285
Um, I've certainly seen it in other instances,

1608
01:34:27.645 --> 01:34:29.245
somebody trying to demonstrate how a, a,

1609
01:34:30.485 --> 01:34:32.165
a bridge crossing would work, um,

1610
01:34:32.225 --> 01:34:33.485
in a slightly different context.

1611
01:34:33.705 --> 01:34:37.525
And it was, it was actually useful to see graphically, um,

1612
01:34:38.065 --> 01:34:41.085
how this scenario was supposedly going to work.

1613
01:34:41.665 --> 01:34:45.165
Um, and I think in this context it would be helpful, um,

1614
01:34:45.165 --> 01:34:47.765
because we've got the,

1615
01:34:48.775 --> 01:34:53.125
we've got IOT finger p we've got East Jetty,

1616
01:34:53.125 --> 01:34:57.205
we've got West Jetty, we've got the Immingham outer, uh,

1617
01:34:57.585 --> 01:35:00.445
Harbor area used by DFTS, um,

1618
01:35:02.545 --> 01:35:03.845
and yet we've heard a lot

1619
01:35:03.845 --> 01:35:06.005

of information about vessel movement.

1620
01:35:06.945 --> 01:35:09.885
Um, but we've got various different parties

1621
01:35:10.105 --> 01:35:11.205
moving ships around.

1622
01:35:12.065 --> 01:35:15.965
Um, and I think it, it would be constructive, um,

1623
01:35:16.105 --> 01:35:18.085
to assist our understanding of

1624
01:35:18.435 --> 01:35:21.085
what a typical day looks like at the moment versus

1625
01:35:21.115 --> 01:35:23.085
what it might look like if you had

1626
01:35:23.085 --> 01:35:24.605
to put six extra movements in.

1627
01:35:27.115 --> 01:35:28.155
I think the applicant,

1628
01:35:28.155 --> 01:35:30.235
you're getting a pretty firm steer from

1629
01:35:30.255 --> 01:35:31.395
the examining authority.

1630
01:35:31.395 --> 01:35:32.955
That's something we'd like to see.

1631
01:35:33.255 --> 01:35:37.275
So by all means go away overnight, um, and consider it.

1632
01:35:37.455 --> 01:35:39.035
Um, and we'll, we'll hopefully

1633
01:35:39.035 --> 01:35:40.395
explore that further in the morning.

1634
01:35:43.575 --> 01:35:48.155
Um, just there was one point, uh, in terms of I OT have,

1635
01:35:48.335 --> 01:35:50.235
has there been any experience

1636
01:35:51.495 --> 01:35:56.315
as things currently standing of where, um,

1637
01:35:57.175 --> 01:36:00.995
iot have found it difficult to manage your traffic in

1638
01:36:00.995 --> 01:36:03.515
amongst everything else that's going on in,

1639
01:36:03.815 --> 01:36:05.075
in, in the harbor area?

1640
01:36:25.215 --> 01:36:29.265
We've also gotta wait. Yeah, but

1641
01:36:38.505 --> 01:36:41.005
The, the answer to your question is, is yes

1642
01:36:41.385 --> 01:36:42.925
and we'll need to do you a note on that.

1643
01:36:44.145 --> 01:36:46.725
Can, can I, can I just interject to that point?

1644
01:36:46.995 --> 01:36:49.165
It's also, uh, accepted.

1645
01:36:49.665 --> 01:36:53.045
Um, uh, this is chapter 16,

1646
01:36:53.045 --> 01:36:54.885

16.8 0.64.

1647
01:36:55.305 --> 01:36:56.805
The priority is to be given

1648
01:36:56.825 --> 01:36:59.365
to tightly restricted vessels such as the tankers

1649
01:36:59.385 --> 01:37:02.685
and presumably your, your description will need to,

1650
01:37:02.945 --> 01:37:05.045
to factor that in that

1651
01:37:05.235 --> 01:37:07.125
that priority will be given to the tankers.

1652
01:37:10.615 --> 01:37:13.355
So, so sorry, could I just ask, just in terms of your

1653
01:37:14.115 --> 01:37:17.835
graphic, just so we are clear, we're we are hoping it will,

1654
01:37:18.135 --> 01:37:21.675
it will be represent arrivals, departures, waiting areas

1655
01:37:22.185 --> 01:37:24.275
with and without the proposed infrastructure.

1656
01:37:24.295 --> 01:37:26.155
So it won't just be, you know,

1657
01:37:26.255 --> 01:37:29.875
in a typical day there will be six more movements, you know,

1658
01:37:29.875 --> 01:37:32.475
because obviously the location in which those movements are

1659
01:37:32.475 --> 01:37:35.635
taking place, whether it's at outer Harbor or this area,

1660
01:37:36.095 --> 01:37:38.395
and we'll have different, different consequences.

1661
01:37:39.015 --> 01:37:41.235
So we are hoping to understand, you know,

1662
01:37:41.235 --> 01:37:44.955
how long it's expected to take for the, these new vessels

1663
01:37:44.955 --> 01:37:47.755
to come in, where other vessels will be waiting, what times

1664
01:37:47.815 --> 01:37:49.955
that's expected, where other vessels are expected

1665
01:37:49.955 --> 01:37:51.755
to be waiting and the implications.

1666
01:37:52.435 --> 01:37:54.075
I just wanted to check if that's aligned with

1667
01:37:54.075 --> 01:37:55.405
what you were hoping for, sir.

1668
01:37:57.305 --> 01:38:01.085
Yes, and I, I think it would be useful if parties were

1669
01:38:01.085 --> 01:38:02.245
to talk with one another,

1670
01:38:02.505 --> 01:38:05.565
and again, you can get some ground rules sorted out as to

1671
01:38:05.565 --> 01:38:09.405
what, uh, might be, um, presented.

1672
01:38:10.345 --> 01:38:14.925
Um, Mr. Bradley was whispering my ear, the, the, the,

1673
01:38:15.385 --> 01:38:19.285

the term typical day might not be most appropriate really.

1674
01:38:19.365 --> 01:38:21.285
I think we've got to look at potentially

1675
01:38:21.285 --> 01:38:24.805
what is the most challenging day in terms of tide cycle,

1676
01:38:25.395 --> 01:38:29.925
what that does, um, to movements in and out of, of the port.

1677
01:38:36.585 --> 01:38:40.485
The only right away I, I think is that yes,

1678
01:38:40.605 --> 01:38:43.805
I would really encourage if you could actually have a

1679
01:38:43.805 --> 01:38:47.085
face-to-face dialogue on this while we're all together, um,

1680
01:38:47.435 --> 01:38:48.565
outside the, the hearing.

1681
01:38:49.545 --> 01:38:53.965
But I think it's down to what is a reasonable,

1682
01:38:54.425 --> 01:38:57.525
um, analysis to supplement chapter 16.

1683
01:38:58.305 --> 01:39:01.925
And that requires a little bit of give or take I think.

1684
01:39:02.655 --> 01:39:03.085
Thank you.

1685
01:39:11.035 --> 01:39:12.035
Makes sense.

1686
01:39:20.175 --> 01:39:23.025
Okay. We, we, looking at our questions, we,

1687
01:39:23.285 --> 01:39:25.585
we think we've come to a sensible time given

1688
01:39:25.585 --> 01:39:28.585
that it's just gone half five to adjourn for the day

1689
01:39:29.565 --> 01:39:32.425
and reconvene tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

1690
01:39:33.605 --> 01:39:37.025
Um, is there anything that anybody wants to raise with us

1691
01:39:37.025 --> 01:39:41.305
before we formally adjourn this, this session of the hearing

1692
01:39:42.215 --> 01:39:43.825
looking no.

1693
01:39:44.505 --> 01:39:48.425
CLDN doesn't, no

1694
01:39:49.105 --> 01:39:52.625
IOT no harbor master anything from the applicant?

1695
01:39:53.125 --> 01:39:54.625
No. Thank you sir. Okay.

1696
01:39:54.775 --> 01:39:58.105
Then, uh, uh, ISH five, uh,

1697
01:39:58.725 --> 01:40:01.985
day one is adjourned and we'll reconvene

1698
01:40:02.045 --> 01:40:04.105
or resume at 10 tomorrow morning.

1699
01:40:04.105 --> 01:40:04.745
Thank you very much.